Trade Verdicts
NBA Trade Verdict

Grizzlies Win

Memphis sent two future second-round picks to acquire Desmond Bane’s draft rights in the 2020 three-team deal, while Boston received the seconds and Portland acquired Enes Kanter.

November 20, 2020 Boston Celtics / Memphis Grizzlies / Portland Trail Blazers Record confidence: Private Record

Boston Celtics Received

Memphis Grizzlies Received

Portland Trail Blazers Received

Boston Celtics

F

Memphis Grizzlies

A+

Portland Trail Blazers

B-

Trade Analysis

Memphis Found a Starting-Caliber Shooter at the End of the First Round

The Grizzlies targeted Desmond Bane with the final pick of the 2020 first round and used a three-team trade to acquire his draft rights from Boston. Memphis sent two future second-round picks, a modest price for a prospect whose shooting, strength and decision-making fit immediately beside Ja Morant and Jaren Jackson Jr. Bane was older than many first-round prospects and had physical measurements some evaluators viewed as limiting, but the Grizzlies prioritized translatable skills. The transaction showed a clear organizational thesis: add a ready shooter on a rookie contract, trust development to expand his game and use a small asset package before the rest of the league corrected its evaluation.

Bane Outgrew the Role Memphis Originally Needed Him to Fill

Bane entered the rotation as a floor spacer and quickly became much more. He made the All-Rookie Second Team, increased his scoring sharply in his second season and developed into a secondary ball handler capable of creating against set defenses. His strength allowed him to defend larger guards and wings, while his shooting forced opponents to stay attached away from Morant. Memphis did not merely acquire a useful late-first-round starter. It developed a 20-point scorer under long-term team control, exactly the kind of outcome that creates a major surplus between player value and acquisition cost.

His Development Helped Turn the Grizzlies into a Fifty-Win Team

Bane’s rise overlapped with Memphis’ jump to 56 wins in 2021-22 and 51 wins the following season. Morant remained the offensive centerpiece and Jackson became Defensive Player of the Year, but Bane’s shooting and half-court creation solved important lineup problems. The Grizzlies could punish defenses that crowded Morant, survive stretches without their lead guard and maintain spacing around traditional centers. Bane’s value became especially clear during injury periods, when he handled more creation without losing efficiency. The trade therefore contributed directly to a young core that moved from play-in hopeful to high seed much faster than expected.

Boston Received Two Seconds and Cleared a Roster Complication

The Celtics’ side involved more than blindly surrendering a future star. Boston was managing roster spots and moved Enes Kanter to Portland in the same three-team transaction while receiving two future second-round picks from Memphis. Those picks eventually became selections at No. 50, far below the value Bane created. The transaction may have served immediate payroll and roster objectives, but the basketball return was plainly inadequate in hindsight. Boston had selected Bane on Memphis’ behalf rather than choosing him for its own roster, yet the opportunity cost remains part of the deal: the Celtics controlled the pick and sold access to a premium player too cheaply.

Portland Received a Useful Center but Not a Long Asset Chain

Portland acquired Kanter, who provided rebounding, interior scoring and regular-season minutes during the 2020-21 campaign. That made the Trail Blazers’ part of the deal functional rather than meaningless. Kanter was a short-term veteran, however, and Portland did not capture the kind of controlled upside Memphis gained. A B-minus recognizes that the Blazers addressed a roster need at limited cost. The transaction’s historical weight rests on the Boston-to-Memphis draft-rights route because that is where the enormous value gap emerged. Portland benefited for a season; Memphis acquired a core player and later a new collection of premium assets.

The 2025 Orlando Trade Multiplied Memphis’ Original Return

Bane’s downstream value became extraordinary when Memphis traded him to Orlando in 2025 for Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, Cole Anthony, four first-round picks and a protected swap. That later deal is a separate transaction and should receive its own page, but it reveals the asset quality Memphis created from two second-round picks in 2020. The Grizzlies received five seasons of Bane’s production and then converted him into one of the largest draft packages ever paid for a non-All-Star. Boston’s two seconds never approached that value. The original draft-night trade therefore deserves an A-plus for Memphis and an F for Boston.

Final Verdict

Grizzlies Win, with Memphis graded A-plus, Boston F and Portland B-minus. Memphis paid two future seconds to acquire Bane’s draft rights, developed him from late-first-round shooter into a 20-point secondary creator and used his prime seasons on multiple 50-win teams. The value chain grew again in 2025, when Bane brought back players, four first-round picks and a swap from Orlando. Boston received two No. 50 selections while routing Kanter to Portland, an enormous hindsight shortfall. Portland obtained a useful one-season center, but Memphis captured both elite on-court value and exceptional downstream trade value.

For Hardcore NBA Heads

How Two Second-Round Picks Became Desmond Bane—and Then a Blockbuster Haul

The 2020 draft-night move is a model of how scouting, timing and player development can transform small assets. Memphis did not own the No. 30 pick, but it identified Bane as a prospect whose shooting and physical strength would translate immediately. Boston was willing to move the draft slot while clearing Kanter, and Portland wanted the veteran center. The Grizzlies supplied two future seconds and acquired a player who became essential to their young core. Five years later, they converted him into four first-round picks, a swap and two veterans. Few transactions demonstrate asset compounding more clearly.

Memphis Drafted for Fit Without Limiting Bane’s Ceiling

Bane’s first job was straightforward: make open threes, defend competently and keep the offense moving around Morant. Memphis did not force him into immediate primary creation, which allowed his strongest skill to translate while his handle and pick-and-roll reads developed. As his responsibilities expanded, the shooting remained stable. That development path is important because late first-rounders often fail when teams either ask too much too soon or confine them permanently to a narrow role. The Grizzlies built a progression from specialist to starter to secondary star, increasing the value of the same rookie contract every season.

The Contract Surplus Was as Important as the Statistics

A productive first-round player gives a team more than points and assists. Bane’s rookie-scale salary allowed Memphis to spend elsewhere, retain depth and evaluate the core before expensive extensions arrived. His production exceeded his cap charge by a wide margin during the club’s rapid rise. That surplus made the original acquisition especially valuable compared with signing a similar shooter in free agency. By the time Bane signed a major extension, the Grizzlies had already received multiple seasons of inexpensive high-level play and knew exactly how he fit with Morant and Jackson.

Boston’s Error Was the Price, Not Simply the Failure to Predict a Star

No team can be expected to identify every late first-round breakout with certainty. The harsher criticism is that Boston moved control of the pick for two distant seconds while Bane’s obvious shooting and readiness matched needs common to every contender. Even if the Celtics did not project him as a future 20-point scorer, a strong rotation wing on a rookie deal would have been valuable. The return offered little upside and eventually produced two late second-round selections. The F grade reflects the asymmetry between the asset surrendered and the limited compensation, not an assumption that Bane’s entire career was obvious on draft night.

Portland Solved a Short-Term Need Inside a Much Larger Value Story

Kanter played meaningful minutes, rebounded at an elite rate and gave Portland offensive production around the basket. The Blazers’ objective was immediate and the player fulfilled it. Their return should therefore be separated from Boston’s. Portland did not control the Bane pick in the same way or accept only late seconds for a future core player. Still, a one-season veteran cannot match Memphis’ five years of production and subsequent draft haul. The B-minus grade acknowledges Portland’s useful outcome while keeping the transaction’s hierarchy clear.

The Orlando Package Confirmed Bane Had Become a Premium Asset

In 2025 Orlando paid Caldwell-Pope, Anthony, four first-rounders and a protected 2029 swap for Bane. The size of that return reflected Bane’s shooting, age, contract and ability to complement high-usage forwards. Memphis chose to reset part of its core, but it did so from a position of extraordinary leverage created by the 2020 trade. The later transaction means the Grizzlies’ original investment did not end when Bane left. It became a multiyear pipeline of future selections and veteran options, turning two seconds into one of the strongest asset chains in franchise history.

Final Verdict

Memphis wins overwhelmingly. The Grizzlies exchanged two second-round picks for a player who became an All-Rookie selection, a 20-point scorer, a key part of consecutive 50-win teams and eventually the centerpiece of a return containing four firsts, a swap and two veterans. Portland received useful short-term value from Kanter and merits a B-minus. Boston’s two late seconds cannot be reconciled with the opportunity cost of the No. 30 pick, producing an F. The deal is not just a draft steal; it is a complete example of identifying, developing and later monetizing a premium player asset.

Research sources (7)