NBA Trade Verdict

Lakers Win

Cleveland surrendered 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington) and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer) for Rick Roberson, leaving the other team with a clear realized-value win.

October 13, 1971 Cleveland Cavaliers / Los Angeles Lakers Record confidence: High

Los Angeles Lakers Received

  • Draft Pick 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price)
  • Draft Pick 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington)
  • Draft Pick 1973 second round pick (#23-Billy Schaeffer

Trade Analysis

What Lasted After the Trade

On October 13, 1971, Los Angeles Lakers and Cleveland Cavaliers completed a deal built around Rick Roberson, 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington), and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer). The trade details matter because the eventual result was not driven by package size alone. Cleveland surrendered 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington) and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer) for Rick Roberson, leaving the partner with a clear realized-value win. Cleveland converted Rick Roberson into a package that ultimately included Jim Price, Kermit Washington and Billy Schaeffer. Roberson was useful, but the first-round value and Washington's long NBA career make this one of the franchise's earliest clear losses. Rick Roberson provided Cleveland with a capable starting center, so the Cavaliers received legitimate immediate value. The Lakers obtained the deeper and more durable asset package. Taken together, those results show why the retrospective evaluation centers on realized player production, draft conversion, contract value and any downstream asset use that is specifically connected to this transaction. The key question is whether one side created durable separation from what it actually received, and the record says it did.

Why One Side Finished Ahead

Los Angeles Lakers own the stronger side of the comparison. Los Angeles won the 1971 deal by turning Rick Roberson into three draft picks, including the selections used on Jim Price and Kermit Washington. Rick Roberson provided Cleveland with a capable starting center, so the Cavaliers received legitimate immediate value. The Lakers obtained the deeper and more durable asset package. Jim Price became an All-Star guard, while Kermit Washington developed into a high-level rebounder and defender before later trades redirected his value. The useful point is not simply that Los Angeles Lakers received 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington), and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer); it is that the return became more valuable than what Cleveland Cavaliers ultimately realized from its side. The A- grade credits that completed value without assuming that every later event was predictable at the moment of the trade. Where the available evidence identifies a consequential player, pick or financial advantage, that realized outcome is the basis for the edge.

What the Losing Package Produced

Cleveland Cavaliers did receive identifiable value, centered on Rick Roberson. Cleveland surrendered 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington) and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer) for Rick Roberson, leaving the partner with a clear realized-value win. Cleveland converted Rick Roberson into a package that ultimately included Jim Price, Kermit Washington and Billy Schaeffer. Roberson was useful, but the first-round value and Washington's long NBA career make this one of the franchise's earliest clear losses. That return is why the losing side still receives a specific D- grade rather than being treated as if it got nothing. But a useful piece, short-term role or plausible trade-day rationale is not the same as matching the better long-term outcome. The comparison stays tied to what the assets became for each franchise, and the evidence in this trade leaves Cleveland Cavaliers short of the value created on the other side.

How Opportunity Cost Shapes the Grades

The grades are A- for Los Angeles Lakers and D- for Cleveland Cavaliers. That spread is a measurement of realized distance, not a claim that every incoming asset for Los Angeles Lakers was a star or that every incoming asset for Cleveland Cavaliers failed. The transaction included Rick Roberson, 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington), and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer), and those pieces carried different levels of production, draft value and strategic usefulness. By grading the two teams separately, the evaluation can recognize legitimate value on the losing side while still reflecting the stronger completed return that supports Lakers Win.

Final Verdict

Lakers Win. Los Angeles Lakers receive A-, while Cleveland Cavaliers receive D-. The decisive evidence is the realized value of the trade: Los Angeles Lakers' side of 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington), and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer) produced the stronger historical return than Cleveland Cavaliers' side of Rick Roberson. The losing team had a defensible asset case and receives credit for what it actually obtained, but the completed production, draft consequence or transaction value described in the available evidence creates enough separation to name a winner. The verdict therefore follows the outcome rather than the size or appearance of the original packages.

For Hardcore NBA Heads

Deep Dive: Why Los Angeles Lakers Finished Ahead of Cleveland Cavaliers

The October 13, 1971 transaction is a useful example of why trade evaluation has to move beyond the first line of the ledger. Los Angeles Lakers and Cleveland Cavaliers exchanged different kinds of value, and some of that value only became clear after the players, picks or financial pieces were actually used. The deeper review asks where the durable return landed, how much credit the losing side still deserves, and whether the explicit A-/D- grade split is supported by the completed record.

What Each Team Actually Received

The list of assets sets the boundaries of the review. Los Angeles Lakers received 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington), and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer); Cleveland Cavaliers received Rick Roberson. Looking at the entire transaction as Rick Roberson, 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington), and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer) prevents the analysis from overfocusing on a single recognizable name while ignoring picks, rights, cash, exceptions or secondary pieces that were part of the same exchange. At the same time, those components are not treated as equal merely because they appear on the trade details. The evaluation weights what each piece actually produced for the franchise that received it.

How Los Angeles Lakers Created the Better Return

The winner-side evidence is strongest when read as a completed-value chain rather than a trade-day forecast. Los Angeles won the 1971 deal by turning Rick Roberson into three draft picks, including the selections used on Jim Price and Kermit Washington. Rick Roberson provided Cleveland with a capable starting center, so the Cavaliers received legitimate immediate value. The Lakers obtained the deeper and more durable asset package. Jim Price became an All-Star guard, while Kermit Washington developed into a high-level rebounder and defender before later trades redirected his value. That documented sequence is what moves Los Angeles Lakers to an A-. It credits production and asset outcomes that actually materialized, while avoiding credit for hypothetical branches that never became franchise value. The result is a narrower and more defensible claim: within this transaction, the return controlled by Los Angeles Lakers proved more consequential than the package sent away.

The Case for Cleveland Cavaliers—and Its Limit

The losing-side perspective still matters because it tests whether the verdict is overstated. Cleveland surrendered 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington) and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer) for Rick Roberson, leaving the partner with a clear realized-value win. Cleveland converted Rick Roberson into a package that ultimately included Jim Price, Kermit Washington and Billy Schaeffer. Roberson was useful, but the first-round value and Washington's long NBA career make this one of the franchise's earliest clear losses. In other words, Cleveland Cavaliers had something concrete to show for the deal, and the D- grade should be read as a measure of that return rather than a dismissal of it. The problem is comparative. Once the two sides are placed next to each other, the best documented value on Cleveland Cavaliers' side does not erase the stronger production, pick outcome or strategic benefit that accumulated for Los Angeles Lakers.

Keeping Hindsight Inside the Transaction

Hindsight should stay focused on value tied directly to the trade. This evaluation credits later player production or draft outcomes when the trade connects them to the assets exchanged, but it does not assume every future move was foreseeable or back-credit unrelated transactions. That distinction matters for a deal involving Rick Roberson, 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington), and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer). It keeps the analysis focused on what this exchange actually created. On that basis, the A- for Los Angeles Lakers and D- for Cleveland Cavaliers describe both the quality of each return and the meaningful distance between them.

Deep-Dive Verdict

Lakers Win remains the deep-dive conclusion. Los Angeles Lakers earn A-; Cleveland Cavaliers earn D-. The available evidence supports the result from both directions: the winner-side evidence identifies the transaction's stronger realized value, while the losing-side evidence shows why the other franchise still deserves credit for Rick Roberson. The final separation comes from what the assets became, not from retrospective name recognition alone. With 1972 second round pick (#16-Jim Price), 1973 first round pick (#5-Kermit Washington), and 1973 second-round pick (No. 23, Billy Schaeffer) on the winning side and Rick Roberson on the other, the production, draft conversion and strategic value are sufficient to preserve the winner without inflating the case beyond the evidence.

Research sources (4)