Trade Verdicts
NBA Trade Verdict

Cavaliers Win

Cleveland acquired Jeff Cook, 1983 first round pick (#20-Roy Hinson) and 2 additional assets for James Edwards and 1983 first round pick (#21-Greg Kite), producing a clear Cavaliers win on realized player, draft and roster value.

February 7, 1983 Cleveland Cavaliers / Phoenix Suns Record confidence: High

Cleveland Cavaliers Received

  • Player Jeff Cook
  • Draft Pick 1983 first round pick (#20-Roy Hinson)
  • Draft Pick 1983 third round pick (#67-Derrick Hord)
  • Cash cash

Phoenix Suns Received

Cleveland Cavaliers

A-

Phoenix Suns

C+

Trade Analysis

What Cleveland and Phoenix Exchanged

Cleveland sent center James Edwards and the 1983 first-round pick that became No. 21 Greg Kite to Phoenix. The Cavaliers received Jeff Cook, Phoenix’s 1983 first-rounder that became No. 20 Roy Hinson, a 1983 third-round pick that became Derrick Hord and cash. Phoenix’s own historical account describes the first-round component as a swap that would occur if the Suns’ pick were the better selection, which it ultimately was by one slot. The transaction therefore was not simply Edwards for Hinson. Cleveland moved an established center and a first while receiving another center, a slightly better first, an additional third and cash. The direct draft result looked modest on paper—one place in the first round—but the identity and later trade value of Hinson changed the historical ceiling of Cleveland’s return.

Roy Hinson Became the Decisive Cleveland Asset

The Cavaliers selected Hinson 20th overall in 1983, and his value grew substantially during three seasons in Cleveland. By 1985-86 he had developed into a high-scoring starting forward. Cleveland then converted that directly tied asset in June 1986, sending Hinson and cash to Philadelphia for the No. 1 overall pick. The Cavaliers used that pick on Brad Daugherty, who became a five-time All-Star and one of the central players of the franchise’s late-1980s and early-1990s rise. That later transaction should not be treated as if the 1983 Suns trade single-handedly acquired Daugherty; Cleveland had to add cash and make a separate decision three years later. But Hinson was the named player Philadelphia accepted for the top pick, so his preserved trade value is legitimate downstream credit. That asset chain is the strongest reason Cleveland reaches A-.

Phoenix Solved a Real Basketball Problem

Phoenix’s C+ should not be confused with a claim that Edwards failed. The Suns were seeking more size at center alongside Alvan Adams, and their own historical account identifies that need as the reason for the February move. Edwards provided exactly the kind of interior option Phoenix wanted and remained with the Suns for several seasons. By 1987-88 he was still productive enough to average roughly 16 points and eight rebounds before Phoenix traded him to Detroit for Ron Moore and a second-round pick. The Suns therefore received meaningful direct production and retained some later transaction value. Their problem in the retrospective grade is opportunity cost. The one-slot first-round exchange produced Hinson for Cleveland, and Hinson eventually carried premium trade value. Phoenix’s return was useful, but it did not create a comparable franchise-level asset chain.

The Smaller Pieces Matter Without Driving the Verdict

Cook, Hord, cash and the exchanged first-round positions round out the trade details. Cook was not the centerpiece of Cleveland’s long-term result, and Hord did not become a major NBA contributor. Those pieces still matter because they show Cleveland received more than a simple one-for-one player exchange, but the A- grade does not depend on inflating their impact. On the Phoenix side, the No. 21 pick became Kite and was later involved in the Suns’ Dennis Johnson trade with Boston, which makes its connection to later value complicated; it should not be treated as an isolated star asset created by this deal. A focused comparison keeps the verdict focused on what can be traced cleanly: Edwards gave Phoenix real center production, while Hinson gave Cleveland both on-court development and unusually strong later trade utility.

Final Verdict

Cavaliers Win. Cleveland receives A- because the deal produced Roy Hinson at No. 20, and Hinson later became the central player Cleveland sent to Philadelphia for the No. 1 pick used on Brad Daugherty. Jeff Cook, Derrick Hord and cash add secondary value but are not the basis of the grade. Phoenix receives C+ because James Edwards was a useful, productive center for the Suns and later returned another player plus a second-round pick; the Suns had a legitimate roster reason for making the move. The separation comes from the long-term value of Hinson’s asset chain. Cleveland’s result became materially more consequential than Phoenix’s, even after accounting for the fact that the Cavaliers had to add cash in the later 1986 trade. This is a strong hindsight win for Cleveland without rewriting Phoenix’s original need for size as an irrational decision.

For Hardcore NBA Heads

Deep Dive: How a One-Pick Swap Helped Lead Cleveland to Brad Daugherty

The February 1983 Cleveland-Phoenix trade is a good example of why historical grading cannot stop at the transaction date. Phoenix received an established center it wanted, while Cleveland moved down the experience curve and collected several pieces. The first-round picks were only one slot apart. Yet Cleveland used the higher pick on Roy Hinson, developed him for three seasons, and then traded Hinson for the first selection in the 1986 draft. That does not make every later Cleveland success part of the 1983 ledger, but it gives the original return a traceable second life that Phoenix’s package never matched.

Phoenix Was Trading for Size, Not Making a Draft-Day Bet

The Suns’ own history places the move in a clear roster context. Phoenix had Alvan Adams but wanted another true center after earlier frontcourt changes, and James Edwards offered established size. The deal sent Jeff Cook, cash and a third-round pick to Cleveland and included the conditional exchange of 1983 first-round positions if Phoenix held the better pick. When the draft order settled, Cleveland moved from No. 21 to No. 20. That one-place jump sounds trivial when viewed without player names. It became important only because Cleveland chose Hinson at 20 and Phoenix’s outgoing first became the asset that generated him. The transaction was therefore reasonable for a Suns team addressing an immediate positional need, while Cleveland accepted uncertainty and multiple assets because its competitive timeline was very different.

Hinson’s Development Changed the Asset Math

Hinson was not an instant franchise player. His importance to this grade comes from how his value developed. Cleveland selected him 20th, gave him room to grow, and by his third season he had become a productive starting forward with enough league value to interest Philadelphia. In June 1986, the Cavaliers sent Hinson and cash to the 76ers for the No. 1 overall pick. Cleveland then selected Daugherty. Official Cavaliers retrospectives explicitly connect Hinson to that draft-day reset. Because Hinson himself was the player moved in the later transaction, partial downstream credit is warranted. The analysis stops there: Daugherty’s entire career is not assigned backward as if Phoenix traded him directly. Instead, the 1983 return gets credit for producing an asset valuable enough to become the principal basketball piece in Cleveland’s acquisition of the top pick.

Edwards Gave Phoenix More Value Than the C+ Might Suggest at First Glance

A losing grade can still contain a successful player acquisition. Edwards filled the size need Phoenix identified, stayed with the club for years and remained productive into the 1987-88 season. When the Suns eventually moved him to Detroit, he was averaging about 16 points and eight rebounds and returned Ron Moore plus a second-round pick. That is meaningful realized value. The C+ is therefore not based on a bust narrative. It reflects the comparative opportunity cost of what Phoenix surrendered. The pick swap and additional pieces gave Cleveland Hinson, and Hinson’s later trade utility dwarfed the secondary value Phoenix eventually received for Edwards. In a completed-value framework, a solid veteran return can still lose decisively when the other side develops and preserves a premium asset.

Why the Daugherty Chain Counts—but Only Partly

Connection to later value is where historical trade grades can become exaggerated. Cleveland did not receive Brad Daugherty from Phoenix in 1983. It received the pick used on Hinson. Three years of development, a separate negotiation with Philadelphia and additional cash were required before Hinson became the No. 1 pick. The correct approach is to recognize the chain without collapsing those separate decisions into one event. Hinson’s presence in the 1986 deal proves that the asset retained substantial value; that is stronger evidence than a hypothetical claim about what Cleveland could have done. At the same time, the later cash contribution and Philadelphia’s independent decision reduce how much of Daugherty’s eventual value should be assigned to the original Suns trade. That calibrated credit is enough for an A- rather than an automatic A+.

Deep-Dive Verdict

Cavaliers Win, Cleveland A- and Phoenix C+. Phoenix acquired the established center it wanted and received several seasons of useful James Edwards production, so this was not a one-sided transaction on the floor. Cleveland’s return simply had a more powerful second life. The No. 20 pick became Roy Hinson; Hinson developed into a valuable forward; and Cleveland later used Hinson plus cash to acquire the No. 1 pick that became Brad Daugherty. That chain is direct enough to matter but separate enough that the grade stops short of treating Daugherty as an original 1983 asset. Cook, Hord, the cash component and Phoenix’s later Edwards return remain part of the accounting, but Hinson’s preserved value is the decisive difference. The final result is a clear Cleveland win produced by patient asset development rather than an obvious robbery on the day of the trade.

Research sources (6)