NBA Trade Verdict

Slight Nuggets Edge

Denver acquired 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee); 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green) from Utah Jazz for Robert Smith (Leroy).

October 9, 1979 Denver Nuggets / Utah Jazz Record confidence: Medium

Denver Nuggets Received

Draft Pick 1980 third-round pick (#48- Eddie Lee )
Draft Pick 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green )

Trade Analysis

Reading the Transaction Through Realized Value

On 1979-10-09, Denver Nuggets and Utah Jazz completed a transaction built around 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee), 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green), and Robert Smith (Leroy). Denver acquired 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee); 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green) from Utah Jazz for Robert Smith (Leroy). The useful starting point is the full exchange rather than the most recognizable name in it. Each player, pick, draft right, financial mechanism, or secondary consideration belongs in the record, but those pieces do not carry equal retrospective weight. The evaluation follows the value that actually materialized for the receiving franchises and uses the package to keep the comparison tied to this trade instead of to unrelated later moves.

Where the Separation Emerged

The verdict is Slight Nuggets Edge, and the grades place Denver Nuggets at C and Utah Jazz at C-. Denver gained a modest realized-value advantage. Denver's side was led by 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green), while the principal outgoing value was Robert Smith (Leroy). The C/C- grades reflect the players and picks that actually materialized, with contract, age, competitive-window fit, and downstream pick conversion treated as context rather than substitutes for realized value. That separation is important because a trade can be understandable for both sides and still finish with a clear retrospective winner. The grade gap measures completed value: player production, realized draft conversion, role, timing, and transaction consequences that the record directly connects to the exchange. It does not require every asset on the winning side to succeed; it requires the stronger side to have created more durable value than the return on the other side.

The Winning Return in Context: Denver Nuggets

For Denver Nuggets, the incoming package centered on 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee) and 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green). Denver gained a modest realized-value advantage. Denver's side was led by 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green), while the principal outgoing value was Robert Smith (Leroy). The C/C- grades reflect the players and picks that actually materialized, with contract, age, competitive-window fit, and downstream pick conversion treated as context rather than substitutes for realized value. That perspective explains why the C grade is attached to the stronger side rather than simply to the larger package. The most substantive pieces were 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee) and 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green), and the record credits what those assets became for the franchise. Where the return included draft value or multiple components, the analysis treats conversion and actual use as part of the outcome instead of assuming that an unexercised possibility had the same value as production that reached the floor.

The Losing Return in Context: Utah Jazz

Utah Jazz received Robert Smith (Leroy). Utah acquired reserve guard Robert Smith for two draft picks later used on Eddie Lee and Ken Green. Smith appeared in only ten Jazz games, while neither selected player reached the NBA. With all three assets producing negligible value, the exchange is best viewed as a slight partner edge only on draft optionality. The C- grade still records the value that side obtained; it is not shorthand for 'nothing.' The comparison turns on whether Robert Smith (Leroy) and the rest of the return could match the stronger completed outcome. In this trade they did not. That is why the losing side can have a defensible trade-day rationale, useful rotation value, or a legitimate asset without erasing the separation reflected in Slight Nuggets Edge.

Final Verdict

Slight Nuggets Edge. Denver Nuggets receive C, while Utah Jazz receive C-. The verdict follows the realized value of the trade: Denver Nuggets' side, led by 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee) and 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green), finished ahead of Utah Jazz's side, led by Robert Smith (Leroy). The result is not based on package length or hindsight name recognition alone. It is based on the production, draft conversion, role, timing, and asset consequences described in the underlying trade details. That evidence supports the explicit grade split and leaves enough completed-value separation to preserve Slight Nuggets Edge.

For Hardcore NBA Heads

Deep Dive: Why Slight Nuggets Edge Fits Denver Nuggets and Utah Jazz

The 1979-10-09 deal between Denver Nuggets and Utah Jazz is more useful as a completed-value study than as a one-line transaction recap. The ledger contains 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee), 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green), and Robert Smith (Leroy), but the deeper question is where the durable value landed after those pieces were used. With explicit grades of C for Denver Nuggets and C- for Utah Jazz, the review has to explain both the winner and the limit of the losing side's case. That means separating what the teams actually received from hypothetical alternatives and keeping every retrospective claim inside the documented transaction.

Start With the Actual Package

The comparison starts with what actually changed hands. Denver Nuggets received 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee) and 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green); Utah Jazz received Robert Smith (Leroy). Reading the exchange this way prevents a familiar mistake in historical trade grading: allowing one famous player or one later draft outcome to erase the rest of the package. The full set of components matters, including secondary pieces, but the evaluation weights them according to realized basketball or asset value. That approach is especially important here because Slight Nuggets Edge depends on the relative strength of the completed returns, not on the number of items that changed hands.

Where the Best Value Landed: Denver Nuggets

The strongest evidence for Denver Nuggets comes from the winner-side sequence. Denver acquired 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee); 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green) from Utah Jazz for Robert Smith (Leroy). Denver gained a modest realized-value advantage. Denver's side was led by 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green), while the principal outgoing value was Robert Smith (Leroy). The C/C- grades reflect the players and picks that actually materialized, with contract, age, competitive-window fit, and downstream pick conversion treated as context rather than substitutes for realized value. Those details are the foundation of the C grade. They show how the incoming package created value that survived the initial transaction and remained meaningful after the assets resolved. The analysis therefore credits 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee) and 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green) for what the record says they produced, while avoiding speculative credit for paths the franchise could have taken but did not.

Why Secondary Pieces Still Matter: Utah Jazz

The countercase begins with Utah Jazz's actual return, not with a caricature of the losing side. On October 9, 1979, Utah Jazz acquired Robert Smith (Leroy) from Denver Nuggets in exchange for 1980 third round pick (#48-Eddie Lee) and 1981 second round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green). Utah acquired reserve guard Robert Smith for two draft picks later used on Eddie Lee and Ken Green. Smith appeared in only ten Jazz games, while neither selected player reached the NBA. With all three assets producing negligible value, the exchange is best viewed as a slight partner edge only on draft optionality. That evidence matters because it establishes what Utah Jazz did receive and why the side still earns C-. Yet the comparison remains relative. When Robert Smith (Leroy) is placed beside 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee) and 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green), the return does not close the gap. Useful short-term value, financial flexibility, or a plausible roster reason can explain a trade without making its completed return equal to the stronger side.

What the Grade Gap Is Measuring

Hindsight is only useful when it stays attached to the transaction. The review can credit a draft pick for the player it became, or a player for the role and production documented after the trade, because those outcomes are connected to the exchanged assets. It should not backfill value from unrelated decisions or assume that every later success was perfectly predictable on 1979-10-09. That bounded approach is what the C/C- split is measuring here: the quality of the realized returns and the distance between them, not a claim of perfect foresight by either front office.

Deep-Dive Verdict

Slight Nuggets Edge remains the deep-dive conclusion. Denver Nuggets are graded C; Utah Jazz are graded C-. The stronger completed return was 1980 third-round pick (#48-Eddie Lee) and 1981 second-round pick (#34-Kenneth Green / Ken Green), while the other side's case rests on Robert Smith (Leroy). Both sides receive credit for value that actually materialized, but the evidence-based comparison leaves Denver Nuggets with the better historical outcome. The decisive point is simple: comparing only the assets in this trade and how they turned out supports the grade gap without overstating the verdict.

Research sources (4)