NBA Trade Verdict

Suns Win

Detroit lost the deal, sending 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple) for David Thirdkill.

October 17, 1983 Detroit Pistons / Phoenix Suns Record confidence: High

Phoenix Suns Received

Draft Pick 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek )
Draft Pick 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple )

Trade Analysis

What the Trade Actually Changed

On October 17, 1983, Phoenix Suns and Detroit Pistons completed a deal built around David Thirdkill, 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), and 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple). The trade details matter because the eventual result was not driven by package size alone. Detroit lost the deal, sending 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple) for David Thirdkill. Detroit clearly lost the trade. Detroit's return centered on David Thirdkill, while the outgoing package centered on 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple). The outgoing side produced the transaction's clearly superior realized value. Contract timing, roster fit and Detroit's competitive window provide context, but the players and draft selections that actually materialized drive the verdict. Taken together, those results show why the retrospective evaluation centers on realized player production, draft conversion, contract value and any downstream asset use that is specifically connected to this transaction. The key question is whether one side created durable separation from what it actually received, and the record says it did.

Why the Winning Side Created Separation

Phoenix Suns own the stronger side of the comparison. On October 17, 1983, the Phoenix Suns acquired 1986 second-round pick (#46-Jeff Hornacek); 1987 second-round pick (#46-Bruce Dalrymple) from the Detroit Pistons in exchange for David Thirdkill. Phoenix received two second-round picks for David Thirdkill, including the selection used on Jeff Hornacek. Hornacek became a franchise cornerstone, All-Star-caliber guard and central piece of later contender teams. Turning a limited player into that level of draft value produced a major Suns win. The useful point is not simply that Phoenix Suns received 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek) and 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple); it is that the return became more valuable than what Detroit Pistons ultimately realized from its side. The A grade credits that completed value without assuming that every later event was predictable at the moment of the trade. Where the available evidence identifies a consequential player, pick or financial advantage, that realized outcome is the basis for the edge.

What the Other Side Still Received

Detroit Pistons did receive identifiable value, centered on David Thirdkill. Detroit lost the deal, sending 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple) for David Thirdkill. Detroit clearly lost the trade. Detroit's return centered on David Thirdkill, while the outgoing package centered on 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple). The outgoing side produced the transaction's clearly superior realized value. That return is why the losing side still receives a specific D grade rather than being treated as if it got nothing. But a useful piece, short-term role or plausible trade-day rationale is not the same as matching the better long-term outcome. The comparison stays tied to what the assets became for each franchise, and the evidence in this trade leaves Detroit Pistons short of the value created on the other side.

Why the Grade Gap Matters

The grades are A for Phoenix Suns and D for Detroit Pistons. That spread is a measurement of realized distance, not a claim that every incoming asset for Phoenix Suns was a star or that every incoming asset for Detroit Pistons failed. The transaction included David Thirdkill, 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), and 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple), and those pieces carried different levels of production, draft value and strategic usefulness. By grading the two teams separately, the evaluation can recognize legitimate value on the losing side while still reflecting the stronger completed return that supports Suns Win.

Final Verdict

Suns Win. Phoenix Suns receive A, while Detroit Pistons receive D. The decisive evidence is the realized value of the trade: Phoenix Suns' side of 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek) and 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple) produced the stronger historical return than Detroit Pistons' side of David Thirdkill. The losing team had a defensible asset case and receives credit for what it actually obtained, but the completed production, draft consequence or transaction value described in the available evidence creates enough separation to name a winner. The verdict therefore follows the outcome rather than the size or appearance of the original packages.

For Hardcore NBA Heads

Deep Dive: Why Phoenix Suns Finished Ahead of Detroit Pistons

The October 17, 1983 transaction is a useful example of why trade evaluation has to move beyond the first line of the ledger. Phoenix Suns and Detroit Pistons exchanged different kinds of value, and some of that value only became clear after the players, picks or financial pieces were actually used. The deeper review asks where the durable return landed, how much credit the losing side still deserves, and whether the explicit A/D grade split is supported by the completed record.

What Each Team Actually Received

The list of assets sets the boundaries of the review. Phoenix Suns received 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek) and 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple); Detroit Pistons received David Thirdkill. Looking at the entire transaction as David Thirdkill, 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), and 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple) prevents the analysis from overfocusing on a single recognizable name while ignoring picks, rights, cash, exceptions or secondary pieces that were part of the same exchange. At the same time, those components are not treated as equal merely because they appear on the trade details. The evaluation weights what each piece actually produced for the franchise that received it.

How Phoenix Suns Created the Better Return

The winner-side evidence is strongest when read as a completed-value chain rather than a trade-day forecast. On October 17, 1983, the Phoenix Suns acquired 1986 second-round pick (#46-Jeff Hornacek); 1987 second-round pick (#46-Bruce Dalrymple) from the Detroit Pistons in exchange for David Thirdkill. Phoenix received two second-round picks for David Thirdkill, including the selection used on Jeff Hornacek. Hornacek became a franchise cornerstone, All-Star-caliber guard and central piece of later contender teams. Turning a limited player into that level of draft value produced a major Suns win. That documented sequence is what moves Phoenix Suns to an A. It credits production and asset outcomes that actually materialized, while avoiding credit for hypothetical branches that never became franchise value. The result is a narrower and more defensible claim: within this transaction, the return controlled by Phoenix Suns proved more consequential than the package sent away.

The Case for Detroit Pistons—and Its Limit

The losing-side perspective still matters because it tests whether the verdict is overstated. Detroit lost the deal, sending 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple) for David Thirdkill. Detroit clearly lost the trade. Detroit's return centered on David Thirdkill, while the outgoing package centered on 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple). The outgoing side produced the transaction's clearly superior realized value. In other words, Detroit Pistons had something concrete to show for the deal, and the D grade should be read as a measure of that return rather than a dismissal of it. The problem is comparative. Once the two sides are placed next to each other, the best documented value on Detroit Pistons' side does not erase the stronger production, pick outcome or strategic benefit that accumulated for Phoenix Suns.

Keeping Hindsight Inside the Transaction

Hindsight should stay focused on value tied directly to the trade. This evaluation credits later player production or draft outcomes when the trade connects them to the assets exchanged, but it does not assume every future move was foreseeable or back-credit unrelated transactions. That distinction matters for a deal involving David Thirdkill, 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek), and 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple). It keeps the analysis focused on what this exchange actually created. On that basis, the A for Phoenix Suns and D for Detroit Pistons describe both the quality of each return and the meaningful distance between them.

Deep-Dive Verdict

Suns Win remains the deep-dive conclusion. Phoenix Suns earn A; Detroit Pistons earn D. The available evidence supports the result from both directions: the winner-side evidence identifies the transaction's stronger realized value, while the losing-side evidence shows why the other franchise still deserves credit for David Thirdkill. The final separation comes from what the assets became, not from retrospective name recognition alone. With 1986 second round pick (#46 – Jeff Hornacek) and 1987 second round pick (#46 – Bruce Dalrymple) on the winning side and David Thirdkill on the other, the production, draft conversion and strategic value are sufficient to preserve the winner without inflating the case beyond the evidence.

Research sources (4)