NBA Trade Verdict

Kings Win

Milwaukee Bucks received Richard Washington. Sacramento Kings received Ernie Grunfeld; 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)); cash.

October 9, 1979 Milwaukee Bucks / Sacramento Kings Record confidence: High

Sacramento Kings Received

Player Ernie Grunfeld
Draft Pick 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias))
Cash cash

Trade Analysis

What Lasted After the Trade

On October 9, 1979, Sacramento Kings and Milwaukee Bucks completed a deal built around Richard Washington, Ernie Grunfeld, 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)), and cash. The trade details matter because the eventual result was not driven by package size alone. Milwaukee Bucks received Richard Washington. Sacramento Kings received Ernie Grunfeld; 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)); cash. The realized value favors the counterparty by a meaningful margin. Milwaukee received Richard Washington and gave up Ernie Grunfeld; 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)); cash. Taken together, those results show why the retrospective evaluation centers on realized player production, draft conversion, contract value and any downstream asset use that is specifically connected to this transaction. The key question is whether one side created durable separation from what it actually received, and the record says it did.

Why One Side Finished Ahead

Kansas City Kings own the stronger side of the comparison. On October 9, 1979, Kansas City Kings acquired Ernie Grunfeld; 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)); cash from Milwaukee Bucks in exchange for Richard Washington. Trading Richard Washington for Ernie Grunfeld gave Kansas City Kings the better long-term outcome. The incoming side produced the transaction’s most consequential player or pick, while the partner’s return never reached comparable value. That separation supports a full Kings-franchise win. The useful point is not simply that Sacramento Kings received Ernie Grunfeld, 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)), and cash; it is that the return became more valuable than what Milwaukee Bucks ultimately realized from its side. The A- grade credits that completed value without assuming that every later event was predictable at the moment of the trade. Where the available evidence identifies a consequential player, pick or financial advantage, that realized outcome is the basis for the edge.

What the Losing Package Produced

Milwaukee Bucks did receive identifiable value, centered on Richard Washington. Milwaukee Bucks received Richard Washington. Sacramento Kings received Ernie Grunfeld; 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)); cash. The realized value favors the counterparty by a meaningful margin. Milwaukee received Richard Washington and gave up Ernie Grunfeld; 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)); cash. That return is why the losing side still receives a specific D+ grade rather than being treated as if it got nothing. But a useful piece, short-term role or plausible trade-day rationale is not the same as matching the better long-term outcome. The comparison stays tied to what the assets became for each franchise, and the evidence in this trade leaves Milwaukee Bucks short of the value created on the other side.

How Opportunity Cost Shapes the Grades

The grades are A- for Sacramento Kings and D+ for Milwaukee Bucks. That spread is a measurement of realized distance, not a claim that every incoming asset for Sacramento Kings was a star or that every incoming asset for Milwaukee Bucks failed. The transaction included Richard Washington, Ernie Grunfeld, 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)), and cash, and those pieces carried different levels of production, draft value and strategic usefulness. By grading the two teams separately, the evaluation can recognize legitimate value on the losing side while still reflecting the stronger completed return that supports Kings Win.

Final Verdict

Kings Win. Sacramento Kings receive A-, while Milwaukee Bucks receive D+. The decisive evidence is the realized value of the trade: Sacramento Kings' side of Ernie Grunfeld, 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)), and cash produced the stronger historical return than Milwaukee Bucks' side of Richard Washington. The losing team had a defensible asset case and receives credit for what it actually obtained, but the completed production, draft consequence or transaction value described in the available evidence creates enough separation to name a winner. The verdict therefore follows the outcome rather than the size or appearance of the original packages.

For Hardcore NBA Heads

Deep Dive: Why Sacramento Kings Finished Ahead of Milwaukee Bucks

The October 9, 1979 transaction is a useful example of why trade evaluation has to move beyond the first line of the ledger. Sacramento Kings and Milwaukee Bucks exchanged different kinds of value, and some of that value only became clear after the players, picks or financial pieces were actually used. The deeper review asks where the durable return landed, how much credit the losing side still deserves, and whether the explicit A-/D+ grade split is supported by the completed record.

What Each Team Actually Received

The list of assets sets the boundaries of the review. Sacramento Kings received Ernie Grunfeld, 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)), and cash; Milwaukee Bucks received Richard Washington. Looking at the entire transaction as Richard Washington, Ernie Grunfeld, 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)), and cash prevents the analysis from overfocusing on a single recognizable name while ignoring picks, rights, cash, exceptions or secondary pieces that were part of the same exchange. At the same time, those components are not treated as equal merely because they appear on the trade details. The evaluation weights what each piece actually produced for the franchise that received it.

How Kansas City Kings Created the Better Return

The winner-side evidence is strongest when read as a completed-value chain rather than a trade-day forecast. On October 9, 1979, Kansas City Kings acquired Ernie Grunfeld; 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)); cash from Milwaukee Bucks in exchange for Richard Washington. Trading Richard Washington for Ernie Grunfeld gave Kansas City Kings the better long-term outcome. The incoming side produced the transaction’s most consequential player or pick, while the partner’s return never reached comparable value. That separation supports a full Kings-franchise win. That documented sequence is what moves Sacramento Kings to an A-. It credits production and asset outcomes that actually materialized, while avoiding credit for hypothetical branches that never became franchise value. The result is a narrower and more defensible claim: within this transaction, the return controlled by Kansas City Kings proved more consequential than the package sent away.

The Case for Milwaukee Bucks—and Its Limit

The losing-side perspective still matters because it tests whether the verdict is overstated. Milwaukee Bucks received Richard Washington. Sacramento Kings received Ernie Grunfeld; 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)); cash. The realized value favors the counterparty by a meaningful margin. Milwaukee received Richard Washington and gave up Ernie Grunfeld; 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)); cash. In other words, Milwaukee Bucks had something concrete to show for the deal, and the D+ grade should be read as a measure of that return rather than a dismissal of it. The problem is comparative. Once the two sides are placed next to each other, the best documented value on Milwaukee Bucks' side does not erase the stronger production, pick outcome or strategic benefit that accumulated for Sacramento Kings.

Keeping Hindsight Inside the Transaction

Hindsight should stay focused on value tied directly to the trade. This evaluation credits later player production or draft outcomes when the trade connects them to the assets exchanged, but it does not assume every future move was foreseeable or back-credit unrelated transactions. That distinction matters for a deal involving Richard Washington, Ernie Grunfeld, 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)), and cash. It keeps the analysis focused on what this exchange actually created. On that basis, the A- for Sacramento Kings and D+ for Milwaukee Bucks describe both the quality of each return and the meaningful distance between them.

Deep-Dive Verdict

Kings Win remains the deep-dive conclusion. Sacramento Kings earn A-; Milwaukee Bucks earn D+. The available evidence supports the result from both directions: the winner-side evidence identifies the transaction's stronger realized value, while the losing-side evidence shows why the other franchise still deserves credit for Richard Washington. The final separation comes from what the assets became, not from retrospective name recognition alone. With Ernie Grunfeld, 1980 second round pick (#40-Dick Miller (Mathias)), and cash on the winning side and Richard Washington on the other, the production, draft conversion and strategic value are sufficient to preserve the winner without inflating the case beyond the evidence.

Research sources (4)