De'Andre Hunter rights / Hayes, Alexander-Walker and future-pick package: What Actually Changed Hands
On July 6, 2019, New Orleans converted the No. 4 pick and related pieces into a broad package from Atlanta. The Hawks acquired the draft rights to De'Andre Hunter and sent New Orleans the rights to Jaxson Hayes, Nickeil Alexander-Walker and Didi Louzada plus future draft compensation. The protected first structure later converted into second-round value, including the pick that became Herb Jones. The trade was part of the Pelicans' attempt to turn the Anthony Davis reset into multiple bites at the draft. This analysis focuses on the exchange itself rather than later franchise history. The important inputs are who was actually moved, how long the incoming assets remained useful, whether draft rights became identifiable players, and whether later value can be traced directly to the original exchange. Team success outside that chain is context, not automatic credit. That distinction prevents a famous name from overwhelming the actual return and also prevents a rebuilding team from being punished simply because it chose a longer timeline.
De'Andre Hunter rights / Hayes, Alexander-Walker and future-pick package: Why the Higher Grade Holds Up
New Orleans did not hit on every incoming piece, but the portfolio produced enough value to justify the strategy. Hayes never developed into the lottery-level center the team hoped for, yet Alexander-Walker became a legitimate NBA guard and the future-pick chain yielded Herb Jones, one of the league's strongest defensive wings on a second-round contract. That downstream hit matters because it was a direct consequence of the protection structure in the original trade rather than an unrelated later move. The higher grade is therefore based on both quality and control. A team deserves more credit when it receives a useful player for several seasons, a meaningful playoff contributor, or an asset that can later be converted without adding disproportionate new value. It deserves less credit when the headline acquisition is productive but short-lived or when later success depends mostly on unrelated moves. The comparison here is not perfection versus failure; it is which side created the stronger combination of performance, duration, fit and retained flexibility.
De'Andre Hunter rights / Hayes, Alexander-Walker and future-pick package: What the Other Side Still Received
Atlanta received a good player in Hunter. He became a starting-caliber two-way forward, contributed to the Hawks' 2021 conference-finals run and later retained trade value. That keeps Atlanta from receiving a weak grade. The issue is concentration: the Hawks gave up several chances to move up for one prospect, and Hunter's injuries plus uneven offensive development prevented him from creating enough separation to overwhelm the combined Pelicans package. Atlanta got a useful starter, just not enough total value to win the trade details. The lower grade still has to recognize real accomplishments. A veteran can stabilize a lineup, a salary move can open choices, and a draft asset can remain useful even if it never becomes a star. The grade falls only when those benefits are materially smaller than what the team surrendered. That approach matters because hindsight should measure the actual exchange without rewriting the original market. The losing side is not judged against an imaginary offer; it is judged against the value the winning side actually realized from the assets that changed hands.
De'Andre Hunter rights / Hayes, Alexander-Walker and future-pick package: The Asset Chain After the First Move
The future-pick branch is the swing factor. Because Atlanta's protected first did not convey as a first, the obligation became second-round picks, and one of those selections became Herb Jones. Jones quickly supplied elite perimeter defense, positional versatility and starter-level minutes at a low salary. The other incoming players were mixed, but the Jones outcome gave New Orleans a premium role player from a secondary asset. That kind of conversion is exactly why multi-asset draft trades can age better than they appear on draft night. Downstream credit is kept conservative. If an incoming player or pick is later traded, only the value clearly carried forward from that asset belongs in this trade details; an unrelated star acquired with several additional premium pieces cannot be credited back in full. The same rule applies to draft capital. A pick matters most when it conveys and becomes a player or when it is directly rerouted in a documented transaction. This keeps the analysis from turning every long franchise history into one endless chain and focuses the grade on value tied directly to the deal.
De'Andre Hunter rights / Hayes, Alexander-Walker and future-pick package: Timing, Leverage and Team Direction
Atlanta was willing to consolidate because Hunter fit a specific need next to Trae Young and John Collins. New Orleans was starting a rebuild and preferred volume, youth and future control. Both strategies were coherent. The Pelicans could tolerate misses because the return was diversified; Atlanta needed Hunter to be clearly better than the combination of Hayes, Alexander-Walker and the future picks. Hunter was solid enough to make the trade competitive but not dominant enough to overcome New Orleans' extra chances. Trade-day context shapes leverage but does not erase outcomes. Age, contract status, injuries, roster balance, tax pressure and the competitive window can all explain why a club accepted a package that looks uneven years later. Those conditions can soften a grade because they define the realistic menu of alternatives. They cannot, however, convert a modest return into an excellent one after the fact. The strongest evaluation combines the options available at the time with what the chosen option eventually produced.
De'Andre Hunter rights / Hayes, Alexander-Walker and future-pick package: The Realistic Alternative
Atlanta could have remained at its original draft positions and selected multiple players, while New Orleans could have kept the No. 4 pick and chosen Hunter or another top prospect. The Pelicans' decision essentially traded certainty for a portfolio. That portfolio contained one lottery miss, one useful guard and one excellent second-round hit. Because the diversified path created more usable pieces over time, the counterfactual does not reveal an obvious missed opportunity for New Orleans. A useful counterfactual stays narrow. The question is not whether a general manager could have foreseen every future draft result or invented a package no team offered. It is whether keeping the outgoing asset, waiting, or choosing the most obvious alternative path would likely have preserved more value. When the actual move solves a real problem efficiently, that supports the grade. When it pays a premium to solve a temporary problem or sacrifices durable control without enough return, the hindsight penalty is justified.
Final Verdict
Pelicans Win. Atlanta received a legitimate starter in De'Andre Hunter, but New Orleans' diversified return produced Nickeil Alexander-Walker, multiple developmental shots and the future-pick chain that became Herb Jones. Hayes' disappointing development keeps the grade below A+, while Hunter's real playoff value protects Atlanta from a harsh mark. The total portfolio still favors New Orleans, A to B. The grading scale also avoids extremes unless the evidence demands them. An A-range result should reflect either exceptional value, a major postseason contribution, a premium asset chain, or several strong outcomes from a modest cost. A C-range result can still include useful players or legitimate strategic benefits, while a D or F requires a clear and durable value deficit. That scale keeps this transaction comparable with the other evidence-based reviews rather than treating every winner as an A+ and every loser as a failure.