The Favors deal tests a common trade-grading mistake: assuming a short tenure cannot create strong value. New Orleans acquired a veteran center for two seconds and used him as a starter during a transition season. The right question is not how long he stayed, but whether the season he supplied was worth more than the draft assets the Pelicans gave up.
Favors Arrived with a Defined Role
New Orleans was assembling a dramatically different roster after trading Anthony Davis. The club had young talent, veteran guards and a new set of draft assets, but it still needed a dependable center who could rebound, screen and defend without demanding the offense run through him. Favors fit that profile. The Pelicans' official release emphasized his rim protection and recent production in Utah, and the season confirmed that he could handle the role. He started 49 games and nearly averaged a double-double. That is not star value, but it is meaningful roster value acquired for two future seconds. The clarity of the role helped the trade succeed even though the relationship lasted only one year.
The Picks Were Real but Low-Cost Currency
Second-round selections should not be dismissed, especially for a rebuilding franchise, but their expected value is lower and more volatile than first-round picks. The two selections sent by New Orleans eventually landed at No. 47 and No. 49. Those positions can produce players, but they also illustrate how limited the opportunity cost was compared with surrendering a premium first. Utah obtained two chances and retained future flexibility; New Orleans obtained a known starting center immediately. The completed player outcomes did not swing those picks into high-end value, so the risk New Orleans accepted remained contained. That cost structure is a central reason the Pelicans deserve B+ rather than merely a neutral grade.
Utah's Frontcourt Logic Was Sensible
The Jazz had spent years balancing Favors and Gobert together, but the league was moving toward more spacing and Utah was increasingly committed to Gobert as the full-time center. Favors was also entering a contract transition. Moving him for picks opened flexibility for a roster that was adding Mike Conley and reshaping around Mitchell and Gobert. That is a legitimate strategic reason to trade a useful player. The C- should therefore not be read as an indictment of the decision to move Favors. It reflects the completed exchange. Utah obtained only late second-round value while New Orleans extracted a full season of starting production. Good strategic logic can still produce a losing trade outcome.
One Season Can Be Enough When the Price Is Right
Trade duration matters only in relation to cost. If New Orleans had paid a first-round pick or a premium young player for one Favors season, the grade would be lower. Two seconds created a much smaller hurdle. Favors supplied 51 games, 49 starts and 9.8 rebounds per game, helping a young team remain functional through injuries and roster change. When he left, the Pelicans did not retain a compensating asset, so the value chain ended. That is why the grade stops at B+. Yet the basic exchange still worked: the Pelicans used low-cost future currency to buy present competence, and the future currency did not later become enough to reverse the result.
Deep-Dive Verdict
Pelicans Win, New Orleans B+ and Utah C-. The Pelicans gave up two second-round picks and received a season of dependable starting-center play from Derrick Favors. His 49 starts and 9.8 rebounds per game provided real value during a transitional season, and the low acquisition cost made a one-year tenure acceptable. Utah had a clear roster reason to move him and did receive future draft currency, so the Jazz are not graded as though they received nothing. The eventual picks were late seconds and did not produce enough realized value to match what Favors delivered in New Orleans. The trade therefore leans clearly to the Pelicans while remaining modest in historical scale.