NBA Trade Verdict

Even Trade

Even Trade. Chicago receives C+ for obtaining the future second-round right later associated with 1992 No. 52 Matt Steigenga, while Portland receives C+ because the Bulls agreed not to exercise their right of first refusal on Michael Holton. The deal involved a free-agent matching option, not two contracted veterans, and neither asset promised a long-term NBA starter. Portland and Chicago reached an agreement on August 5, 1986 involving veteran Michael Holton's free agency. The Bulls agreed not to exercise their right of first refusal on Holton, and the T

August 5, 1986 Chicago Bulls / Portland Trail Blazers Record confidence: Medium

Chicago Bulls Received

  • Draft Pick 1992 second round pick (#52-Matt Steigenga)

Portland Trail Blazers Received

  • Consideration Bulls agreed to not exercise their right of first refusal on free agent Michael Holton

Trade Analysis

A Free-Agent Right Was Exchanged for a Future Second

Portland and Chicago reached an agreement on August 5, 1986 involving veteran Michael Holton's free agency. The Bulls agreed not to exercise their right of first refusal on Holton, and the Trail Blazers surrendered a future second-round selection. That draft right eventually appears in the historical ledger as the 1992 No. 52 choice associated with Matt Steigenga. This was not a trade of two existing NBA contracts or a deal immediately involving Steigenga in 1986; he had yet to be drafted. The value lay in Portland's ability to pursue Holton and Chicago's compensation for relinquishing an option.

Portland Sought a Known Guard Without an Offer-Sheet Fight

The Trail Blazers could pursue Holton without Chicago invoking its matching rights, simplifying a free-agent roster decision. Holton was a player with NBA guard experience rather than a future prospect, which explains why the club would give up a distant lower-round selection. His prior seasons with other franchises aren't Portland playing time produced by the arrangement, and his eventual contributions should be read from the receiving team's actual seasons. Portland received the opportunity to sign or retain the targeted guard, not an automatic guarantee that he would become a long-serving starting player or that the team would win more games.

Chicago's Second Became a 1992 Draft Slot

The Bulls secured a future second-round asset in exchange for stepping aside on Holton's free agency. Six years later, the draft ledger associates that position with Steigenga at No. 52. Such a long-delayed selection had value as a prospect opportunity or as a trade component, but it did not supply Chicago with an immediately established guard in 1986. The actual rights chain and player selection must be kept separate from any professional seasons elsewhere. This was also a different period of roster rules, so the transaction should not be rewritten as a contemporary restricted-free-agent sign-and-trade with assumed modern salary exceptions.

Different Forms of Modest Value Produce an Even Result

Portland gained access to an identified NBA veteran, while Chicago obtained a future selection it could use to explore young talent. Neither benefit resembled acquiring a star, and the elapsed time before the draft lowered the certainty of Chicago's eventual return. The agreement is best evaluated as balanced compensation for the use or nonuse of a free-agent matching right. It would be misleading to assign a complete later NBA career to either club based on the original agreement alone. Equal moderate grades acknowledge that both front offices received a reasonable tool for their immediate priorities.

Final Verdict

Even Trade. Chicago receives C+ for obtaining the future second-round right later associated with 1992 No. 52 Matt Steigenga, while Portland receives C+ because the Bulls agreed not to exercise their right of first refusal on Michael Holton. The deal involved a free-agent matching option, not two contracted veterans, and neither asset promised a long-term NBA starter.

Research sources (6)