NBA Trade Verdict

Seattle SuperSonics Win

Seattle received 1978 second round pick (#42-Keven McDonald); 1979 second round pick (#40-Andrew Fields) and sent Mike Green. Seattle finished with the modest hindsight edge.

November 12, 1977 San Antonio Spurs / Sonics Record confidence: Medium

Sonics Received

Draft Pick 1978 second round pick (#42-Keven McDonald)
Draft Pick 1979 second round pick (#40-Andrew Fields)

Trade Analysis

Seattle Chose Draft Flexibility over Mike Green's Immediate Depth

Seattle sent Mike Green to San Antonio for two second-round picks, one in 1978 and one in 1979. The picks were later associated with Keven McDonald at No. 42 and Andrew Fields at No. 40. Neither selection became a major NBA player, so the case for Seattle cannot rest on hidden star value. The advantage instead comes from the structure of the exchange. The SuperSonics moved a veteran big man for two future draft chances at a moment when the roster was being reshaped. San Antonio received the known player and Seattle received optionality. With neither side producing a major long-term outcome, the trade grades should remain relatively conservative.

San Antonio Got a Real Player, Which Keeps the Grade Close

The Spurs were not trading two seconds for nothing. Green had been a productive frontcourt player earlier in the decade and offered immediate size to a team that went 52-30 in 1977-78. That direct roster value is why San Antonio remains at C rather than falling into a failing grade. The problem is durability and upside. Green did not become a long-term foundational Spur, while Seattle had two separate draft assets to work with. Even though those picks ultimately produced little NBA impact, two chances at future value for a veteran outside Seattle's long-term core were a reasonable return. The completed result leans Seattle rather than overwhelming San Antonio.

The 1979 Pick Has to Be Read in Seattle's Broader Transaction Context

Seattle's November 1977 transaction log is unusually busy. One day before the Green trade, the SuperSonics sent a 1979 second-round pick that later became Andrew Fields to Portland in the Wally Walker deal. The next day, Seattle acquired a 1979 second tied to the same eventual selection in the Green trade with San Antonio. That sequence shows why draft-pick histories can look circular when read decades later. The correct grading approach is not to claim Seattle created Andrew Fields twice. It is to recognize that the Green trade replenished second-round draft capital immediately after Seattle had used similar capital elsewhere. That flexibility had value even though the eventual player outcome was modest.

B versus C Fits a Low-Impact Historical Deal

This is not a trade that should produce extreme grades. Seattle received two picks but did not turn them into lasting NBA contributors. San Antonio received an established player but did not gain a franchise-changing piece. The modest B/C split reflects the difference between asset management and direct production. Seattle converted a veteran into two future opportunities, an efficient choice for a roster that would soon change dramatically under Lenny Wilkens. San Antonio paid a reasonable draft price for immediate depth on a 52-win team. In hindsight, Seattle's side had slightly better flexibility and lower long-term opportunity cost, but the realized value on both sides remained limited.

Final Verdict

Seattle SuperSonics Win. Seattle receives B because it converted Mike Green into two second-round picks and replenished future draft flexibility during a period of active roster reconstruction. The selections later associated with Keven McDonald and Andrew Fields did not become major NBA contributors, so the grade stays out of the A range. San Antonio earns C because Green was a legitimate veteran addition for a strong team, making the exchange defensible as an immediate-depth move. He did not provide enough long-term value to overcome the two draft chances Seattle obtained. The documented Seattle SuperSonics Win verdict is therefore modest: Seattle managed the asset more efficiently, but neither side created enough completed value for an extreme grade.

For Hardcore NBA Heads

Deep Dive: Why Two Second-Round Picks Were Enough to Give Seattle the Edge

The Mike Green trade looks tiny next to the famous deals of the 1970s, but it captures an important roster-building choice. Seattle exchanged known veteran depth for two uncertain draft assets; San Antonio did the opposite. Because the eventual player outcomes were limited, the best analysis focuses on price, timing and flexibility rather than pretending a hidden star determined the result.

Seattle Was in the Middle of a Rapid Roster Reset

The SuperSonics' 1977-78 transaction log shows a team moving aggressively. Seattle acquired Wally Walker on November 11, traded Green on November 12, changed coaches later that month and continued reshaping the roster. In that environment, turning a veteran big man into two future selections fit a broader effort to create options. The picks were not premium firsts, but second-round capital still allowed the organization to draft, trade or replace assets spent elsewhere. This matters when grading a low-profile deal: value can come from maintaining flexibility during a transition even if the individual picks do not later become stars. Seattle's B reflects competent asset management rather than a dramatic talent victory.

San Antonio's Decision Matched a 52-Win Team's Priorities

The Spurs finished 52-30 and won their division in 1977-78. Acquiring a veteran big man for second-round selections therefore had a rational competitive logic. Teams expecting to win immediately can reasonably discount distant or lower-probability draft assets in favor of depth. Green gave San Antonio a known NBA body rather than another prospect to develop. The C grade recognizes that logic. The trade becomes a loss only because the direct player return was not strong enough or long-lived enough to make the two-pick cost look favorable in hindsight. San Antonio paid for certainty, but the certainty produced ordinary rather than difference-making value.

Why Hindsight Needs Restraint With Draft Picks

The 1979 second tied to Andrew Fields appears in multiple Seattle transactions around the same time, which can tempt a retrospective analysis into over-crediting asset chains. Seattle had already sent a 1979 second in the Wally Walker deal and then acquired a 1979 second from San Antonio. The proper approach is to follow each obligation without pretending every later selection belongs fully to every earlier transaction. For this trade, Seattle gets credit for receiving two second-round assets. It does not get extra credit because one pick can be linked elsewhere in the club's transaction history. That restraint is important to keeping the B grade proportional to the deal's true scale.

No Star Outcome Is Required for Seattle to Win

A trade can be won even when the winning team does not draft a star. Seattle's advantage comes from exchanging one veteran for two independent future chances while San Antonio's acquired player produced limited long-term franchise value. If either McDonald or Fields had become a high-level contributor, the grade gap would be wider. They did not, so the result remains modest. The SuperSonics still improved their future option set at low strategic cost, while the Spurs used two picks on short-term depth. That is enough for a B/C split. It is a useful reminder that trade grading should scale with the transaction rather than forcing every historical deal into a dramatic winner-and-loser narrative.

Deep-Dive Verdict

Seattle SuperSonics Win, Seattle B and San Antonio C. The SuperSonics received two second-round picks for a veteran who was not central to their long-term plan, giving the franchise useful flexibility during a period of rapid roster change. The eventual selections, Keven McDonald and Andrew Fields, did not create major NBA value, which keeps Seattle's grade restrained. San Antonio's decision was defensible for a 52-win team seeking immediate frontcourt depth, and Mike Green was a real NBA player rather than dead salary. The Spurs simply did not receive enough durable return to make two future selections look like the better completed package. Seattle owns the edge, but appropriately by one grade band rather than several.

Research sources (5)