Atlanta moved from No. 35 to No. 27 in the 1989 draft and…
Atlanta moved from No. 35 to No. 27 in the 1989 draft and selected receiver Shawn Collins, sending Cincinnati the 35th, 89th and 256th selections. Collins flashed as a rookie and finished with 98 career catches for 1,433 yards, while Eric Ball became the most useful Bengal from the return. Neither side generated enough lasting impact to create a clear winner.
Atlanta Falcons Received
- pick 1989 first round pick (#27-Shawn Collins)
Cincinnati Bengals Received
- pick 1989 second round pick (#35-Eric Ball)
- pick 1989 fourth round pick (#89-Kerry Owens)
- pick 1989 tenth round pick (#256-Cornell Holloway)
Trade Analysis
Atlanta's move up was aimed at finding a first-round receiving weapon. Shawn Collins showed why the Falcons liked him, catching 58 passes for 862 yards and three touchdowns as a rookie. That first season represented meaningful production, but it did not become the beginning of a long run as a top target. Collins finished his NFL career with 98 receptions for 1,433 yards and five touchdowns, leaving Atlanta with a useful but ultimately limited return for the 27th selection.
Cincinnati spread its chances across three picks. The best result came immediately at No. 35 with Eric Ball. He carved out a multi-year NFL career as a running back and return contributor, appearing in 97 games overall. Kerry Owens and Cornell Holloway did not add enough to turn the quantity of the Bengals' package into a decisive advantage. Cincinnati therefore received more total opportunities but no player who clearly separated from Collins in impact.
That is why matching C+ grades fit. Atlanta can point to a strong rookie season and real receiving production from the player it targeted, but the Falcons paid three selections and did not get the long-term first-round centerpiece they wanted. Cincinnati can point to Ball's longevity and the sound logic of moving down for volume, but the extra selections did not develop into major pieces. Both teams realized some value, neither suffered a catastrophe, and neither created enough surplus to claim a meaningful win. The trade belongs in the middle of the scale rather than forcing a winner from two modest outcomes.