Chicago moved down from No. 40 to No. 48 in the 1999 second…
Chicago moved down from No. 40 to No. 48 in the 1999 second round and received Oakland's third-rounder while swapping fourth-round positions. The Bears used the package on Russell Davis, Marty Booker and Rosevelt Colvin. Booker became a Pro Bowl receiver and Colvin developed into a double-digit-sack edge defender. Oakland received Tony Bryant and Dameane Douglas, making Chicago's added depth and top-end production decisively better.
Chicago Bears Received
- pick 1999 2nd round pick (48th overall, Russell Davis), 1999 3rd round pick (78th overall, Marty Booker) and 1999 4th round pick (111th overall, Rosevelt Colvin)
Las Vegas Raiders Received
- pick 1999 2nd round pick (40th overall, Tony Bryant )
- pick 1999 4th round pick (102nd overall, Dameane Douglas)
Trade Analysis
Chicago turned one second-round slot into three players by moving down eight places. The Bears sent Oakland the 40th pick and the 102nd pick, receiving Nos. 48, 78 and 111. Oakland used No. 40 on defensive end Tony Bryant and No. 102 on wide receiver Dameane Douglas. Bryant became a useful rotational pass rusher and started 30 games during his Raiders tenure, but he never developed into a high-end defensive cornerstone. Douglas provided limited receiving production.
Chicago's return was deeper and ultimately much more productive. The Bears selected defensive tackle Russell Davis at No. 48, wide receiver Marty Booker at No. 78 and linebacker Rosevelt Colvin at No. 111. Davis became a long-term NFL contributor. Booker developed into Chicago's leading receiver, posted consecutive 1,000-yard seasons in 2001 and 2002 and made the Pro Bowl. Colvin emerged as an explosive edge defender, recording 10.5 sacks in both 2001 and 2002 before leaving for New England in free agency. Those three players gave Chicago meaningful production at three different positions.
The most striking part of the deal is that the Bears did not need one unlikely late-round hit to win. Booker and Colvin both became impact starters, while Davis supplied additional value. Oakland's Bryant was serviceable, but the Raiders paid the extra third-round selection to move up and did not land a player whose production justified consolidating the picks.
Draft trade-downs are often praised too easily because acquiring more selections looks efficient on paper. This one deserves the praise because Chicago converted the extra chances into actual NFL performance. Booker alone had a better Bears peak than either Oakland acquisition, and Colvin added another starter with double-digit-sack seasons. Oakland did receive usable players, which keeps the grade above an outright failure, but the cumulative value gap is substantial. Chicago clearly wins the trade and deserves a strong grade for both process and execution.