Oakland sent Doug Jolley plus three 2005 selections to the…
Oakland sent Doug Jolley plus three 2005 selections to the Jets and received Nos. 26 and 230. The Raiders quickly recycled both picks: No. 26 became part of the move up for Fabian Washington, while No. 230 was later packaged to New England. The return was mostly flexibility rather than a lasting player, but Oakland escaped an expensive tight-end commitment and controlled valuable draft capital.
Las Vegas Raiders Received
- pick 2005 1st round pick (26th overall subsequently traded, Chris Spencer )
- pick 2005 7th round pick (230th overall subsequently traded, Matt Cassel )
New York Jets Received
- pick Doug Jolley, 2005 2nd round pick (47th overall, Mike Nugent ), 2005 6th round pick (182nd overall, Cedric Houston) and 2005 6th round pick (185th overall subsequently traded, Chad Owens )
Trade Analysis
The 2005 Doug Jolley exchange is messy because the important value did not remain in one place for long. Oakland sent Jolley and three selections to New York in exchange for the 26th and 230th picks. The Raiders then treated those picks as currency. No. 26 was paired with a fourth-rounder in the trade with Seattle that moved Oakland up to No. 23 for Fabian Washington. No. 230 was later sent to New England with a 2006 fifth-round pick in exchange for a sixth-round selection. Evaluating Oakland therefore requires looking at the flexibility the deal created rather than pretending the Raiders simply drafted two players with the incoming choices. New York's side was more direct. Jolley became the starting tight end for much of 2005 but caught only 29 passes for 324 yards before the Jets moved on. The second-round pick became kicker Mike Nugent, whose long NFL career eventually validated his talent but whose Jets tenure was uneven and ended after four seasons. Cedric Houston gave New York two years of reserve running-back production. The other sixth-round selection changed hands again before the draft. The Jets did receive real NFL players, so this was not a disaster. Yet spending a first-round asset to assemble a veteran tight end and lower picks requires more than modest short-term production. Oakland, meanwhile, used the incoming capital to reshape the next sequence of its draft board. Neither club unlocked elite value. The Raiders deserve the better grade because they converted an expendable veteran and later selections into higher-leverage draft flexibility, while the Jets' most visible returns failed to become durable core pieces in New York. The margin is moderate, not overwhelming, but the transaction aged better from Oakland's perspective.