Jacksonville moved from No. 7 to No. 5 in the 2012 draft to…

Jacksonville made the deal for a straightforward reason: the offense badly needed a true No. 1 receiver, and Justin Blackmon had been one of college football's most productive players. The Jaguars paid a fourth-round pick to move from seventh to fifth, a modest premium for a prospect they believed could transform a passing game that had finished at the bottom of the league. Blackmon initially showed why. He produced a 236-yard game as a rookie and followed with another explosive stretch in 2013, demonstrating the size, strength and after-catch ability that made him a top-five selection.

The problem was availability. Blackmon played only 20 NFL games before league suspensions effectively ended his career. Jacksonville therefore received little lasting value from both the fifth pick and the extra fourth-round selection it surrendered. A trade built around landing a franchise receiver instead produced less than two full seasons of play.

Tampa Bay's side aged much better. The Buccaneers moved down only two spots and still selected one of their primary targets, Alabama safety Mark Barron, at No. 7. Barron started from the beginning and, although Tampa Bay later moved him to St. Louis, he retained enough value to bring draft compensation back to the organization. The No. 101 pick also mattered beyond its face value. Tampa Bay used that selection as part of the chain of draft-day trades that helped the club maneuver for Doug Martin and Lavonte David.

That downstream value should not be treated as if both later stars came directly from Jacksonville's fourth-rounder, but it does reinforce the basic result: Tampa Bay preserved its preferred first-round target while gaining useful flexibility, and Jacksonville paid extra for a player whose career was cut dramatically short. The evidence supports a decisive Buccaneers advantage.