Washington paid a 1986 tenth-round pick and its 1987…

Washington aggressively targeted receiver Walter Murray in the 1986 draft. To reach him, the club sent San Francisco a tenth-round selection and its 1987 first-round pick for No. 45. Contemporary reporting and Washington's historical materials describe the future first-rounder as the central cost. Washington then selected Murray, but the intended payoff unraveled when he did not sign with the team.

That failure matters more than the eventual identities attached to San Francisco's picks. Washington spent future first-round capital to secure immediate access to a player who never played a regular-season snap for the club. The rights to Murray were later traded to Indianapolis for a 1987 second-round pick, which gave Washington some recovery value, but that later move could not fully restore the premium asset originally surrendered.

San Francisco's return included the 1987 first-round selection that became No. 25, along with the 1986 tenth-rounder. The 49ers did not land a Hall of Fame player from those selections, so a B+ rather than an A reflects the actual downstream results. Still, acquiring a future first for a second-round slot created substantial value and flexibility.

Washington's D comes from the combination of premium cost and failed immediate objective. The franchise identified a player, paid heavily to move up, and could not get him under contract. San Francisco wins because it accepted that risk from the other side and secured valuable future capital without giving up an established contributor.

The later Murray-to-Indianapolis deal softened Washington's loss by returning a second-round pick, but it did not erase the original premium. San Francisco controlled the more valuable asset throughout the chain and therefore deserves the stronger grade.