Tampa Bay acquired quarterback Chris Chandler from…

This trade became painful for Tampa Bay because the future first-round pick appreciated dramatically. When the Buccaneers acquired Chris Chandler in July 1990, they were paying for a young quarterback with starting experience and hoping he could stabilize the position. Instead, Chandler's Tampa Bay tenure was brief and did not provide the sustained starting answer the club sought. The cost remained in place even after the short-term plan failed.

By 1992, the selection owed to Indianapolis had become No. 2 overall. The Colts used it on linebacker Quentin Coryatt, one of the most prominent defenders in that draft class. Coryatt started 77 games during his Indianapolis tenure and spent six seasons as a regular in the Colts defense. He did not become a Hall of Fame-level star, but he gave Indianapolis far more durable value than Tampa Bay received from Chandler.

Future first-round trades always carry hidden standings risk, and this is an unusually clear example. Tampa Bay did not simply lose a generic late first-rounder; the Buccaneers surrendered the second pick in the draft after failing to extract a long-term quarterback solution from the player they acquired. Indianapolis deserves an A-range grade for converting Chandler into a premium selection and then into a multi-year starter. Tampa Bay falls near the bottom of the scale because both halves of the bet went against the club: the quarterback stay was short, and the deferred price escalated into one of the most valuable picks in the league. In hindsight, the draft-position swing magnified every weakness in Tampa Bay's original bet and every benefit Indianapolis gained by waiting.