Jacksonville Jaguars

Summary: Jacksonville moved up five spots in the fourth round and added a sixth-rounder from Carolina. Analysis: The Jaguars improved position for Wesley Williams while keeping an extra late pick in the exchange. It is a small board-management win, not a major swing.

Summary: Jacksonville moved from picks 196 and 245 to pick 191 with New England. Analysis: This was a minor late-round consolidation to secure Josh Cameron. The cost was small, and the outcome should be treated as neutral until the player result is known.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Ruke Orhorhoro from Atlanta for Maason Smith. Analysis: This is a young defensive-lineman swap with draft-pedigree upside on both sides. Until either player separates, the fairest verdict is a provisional even trade.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Jakobi Meyers from Las Vegas for future fourth- and sixth-round picks. Analysis: Meyers is a proven receiver, but the price is real for a veteran target. The move makes sense if Jacksonville needed immediate reliability, though the draft cost keeps it from becoming a bargain.

Summary: Jacksonville swapped Tyson Campbell and a future seventh for Greg Newsome and a future sixth. Analysis: This is a notable cornerback reset rather than a simple salary dump. Newsome gives Jacksonville a comparable starting-caliber option, while Cleveland gets the higher-upside long-term corner if Campbell rebounds.

Summary: Jacksonville traded Tank Bigsby to Philadelphia for future fifth- and sixth-round picks. Analysis: That is a strong return for a running back with a crowded role and uneven early production. The value leans toward Jacksonville unless Bigsby becomes a clear rotational weapon in Philadelphia.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Tim Patrick from Detroit for a 2026 6th-round pick. Analysis: Patrick gave Jacksonville veteran receiver depth, but sending a sixth for an aging receiver profile keeps the grade modest. The move is more situational patch than long-term value.

Summary: Jacksonville traded Fred Johnson to Philadelphia for a 2026 7th-round pick. Analysis: The Jaguars converted a depth offensive lineman into late draft capital. It is a small win if Johnson was outside their plans, though the return is naturally limited.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Khalen Saunders from New Orleans for Luke Fortner. Analysis: This was a player-for-player depth swap, with Jacksonville prioritizing defensive-line help and moving on from a struggling interior offensive lineman. The value is close and role-dependent.

Summary: Jacksonville moved down from pick 70 to pick 102 while adding two future third-round picks from Detroit. Analysis: This is a classic delayed-value trade. The Jaguars sacrificed immediate draft position but added two future Day 2 assets, making the final grade dependent on how those future picks develop.

Summary: Jacksonville moved from pick 102 to pick 89 with Houston, adding a seventh-rounder while sending a fifth. Analysis: The Jaguars used accumulated draft capital to climb back up for Wyatt Milum. The move is reasonable, but the value is close enough that player development will decide the final winner.

Summary: Jacksonville paid a premium package to move from No. 5 to No. 2 in the 2025 draft for Travis Hunter, also receiving fourth- and sixth-round picks. Analysis: Hunter's two-way upside is generational and gives Jacksonville a rare ceiling bet. The price, however, included a second-rounder, a fourth-rounder, and a future first, making this a true premium buy rather than a clean steal.

Summary: Jacksonville traded Christian Kirk to Houston for a 2026 7th-round pick. Analysis: The move cleared a veteran receiver contract, but the football return was thin for a player who had produced as a legitimate WR2 in Jacksonville. Getting only a 7th for a former major free-agent signing makes this a disappointing exit unless the cap flexibility becomes more valuable than the public record shows.

Too early for a final verdict. Minnesota received Cam Robinson and a conditional 2026 pick (7th round; did not convey) and sent 2026 4th round pick (117th overall subsequently traded, Travis Burke); grade should stay TBD until the assets develop.

Seattle acquired Roy Robertson-Harris from Jacksonville Jaguars on 2024-10-14, sending 2026 6th round pick (213th overall subsequently traded, Jordan van den Berg) in return. Seattle's side of this 2024 draft-capital exchange was straightforward: the Seahawks received Roy Robertson-Harris and surrendered 2026 6th round pick (213th overall subsequently traded, Jordan van den Berg). The B grade reflects the known return, while Jacksonville Jaguars's C grade accounts for the countervalue. The trade belongs as a standard database entry because its documented impact was real but not franchise-shaping.

Seattle acquired Trevis Gipson from Jacksonville Jaguars on 2024-08-26, sending 2025 6th round pick (194th overall, Jalen McLeod) in return. The trade is best understood as a narrow roster or draft-position move. Seattle acquired Trevis Gipson and gave up 2025 6th round pick (194th overall, Jalen McLeod), with the available evidence supporting a B grade rather than a stronger verdict. It should remain in the public database, but the analysis should not pretend it changed the arc of Seahawks history.

Minnesota paid a premium to move up for Dallas Turner; the grade is still too early and depends on pass-rush production.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Mac Jones from New England Patriots for 2024 6th round pick (193rd overall, Joe Milton). Analysis: Jacksonville used a sixth-round pick on a backup quarterback with starting experience. The cost was modest enough to make the bet defensible.

Minnesota received 2024 6th round pick (177th overall, Walter Rouse) and sent Ezra Cleveland.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2026 7th round pick (233rd overall, Zach Durfee) from Detroit Lions for Riley Patterson. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2023 7th round pick (227th overall, Raymond Vohasek), 2024 4th round pick (116th overall, Jordan Jefferson) from New Orleans Saints for 2023 4th round pick (127th overall, Jake Haener). Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2023 2nd round pick (61st overall, Brenton Strange), 2023 5th round pick (136th overall, Yasir Abdullah) from Chicago Bears for 2023 2nd round pick (56th overall, Tyrique Stevenson). Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange. Jacksonville addressed a roster or draft-board preference, while the partner received comparable value in return.

Summary: Jacksonville traded down from #24 to #25, receiving a 5th (Antonio Johnson, 160th) and 7th (Derek Parish, 240th) from the Giants. Analysis: Moving down one spot and picking up a 5th and 7th is textbook trade-down value. The picks at 25 (Dalton Kincaid, subsequently traded to Bills) and 24 (Deonte Banks for Giants) were close in value. Jacksonville netted two additional picks without meaningfully changing their position. This was a solid structural move by the Jaguars' front office, part of a two-step trade-down strategy that ultimately landed Anton Harrison.

Summary: Jacksonville received the 27th pick (Anton Harrison) and a 4th (Tyler Lacy, 130th) from Buffalo for the 25th pick (Dalton Kincaid). Analysis: Moving down 2 spots in Round 1 while gaining a 4th-round pick is solid structural value. Dalton Kincaid became a starting tight end in Buffalo; Anton Harrison became Jacksonville's starting left tackle. Both players developed meaningfully, and Jacksonville gained extra draft capital. This was smart draft-day maneuvering — the Jaguars moved down twice and still landed a starting left tackle plus added picks.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired WR Calvin Ridley from Atlanta (while Ridley was suspended for the entire 2022 season) for a 2023 5th-round pick and a conditional 2024 3rd-round pick. Analysis: Jacksonville gambled on Ridley's return from suspension. He played one solid season in 2023 (1,016 yards), then departed in free agency. Paying a 3rd and 5th for one productive season and then losing the player for nothing is a poor long-term return. Atlanta received picks for a player they effectively had to move. The trade is better characterized as a slight Atlanta win — they sold high on a suspended player and got draft capital. Jacksonville's C+ is too generous. Grade revised to C. Atlanta sold high on a suspended star; Jacksonville's one-year rental ultimately cost a third-round-level return for limited long-term value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2023 6th round pick (185th overall, Parker Washington) from New York Jets for James Robinson. Analysis: Jacksonville extracted a sixth-round pick for a running back who was no longer central to the plan. The Jets took the short-term roster swing.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2023 7th round pick (226th overall, Cooper Hodges), 2024 6th round pick (177th overall subsequently traded, Walter Rouse) from Carolina Panthers for Laviska Shenault. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Cole Van Lanen from Green Bay Packers for 2023 7th round pick (242nd overall, Anthony Johnson). Analysis: This was a late-round or depth-chart exchange with limited franchise impact. The value difference is small enough to treat as essentially even.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2022 5th round pick (154th overall, Snoop Conner) from Philadelphia Eagles for 2022 6th round pick (188th overall subsequently traded, Malcolm Rodriguez), 2022 6th round pick (198th overall, Grant Calcaterra). Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2023 4th round pick (121st overall, Ventrell Miller) from Tampa Bay Buccaneers for 2022 5th round pick (157th overall, Zyon McCollum), 2022 7th round pick (235th overall subsequently traded, Daniel Hardy). Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville traded back into Round 1 (from 33rd to 27th overall) to select LB Devin Lloyd, sending Tampa Bay a 2nd (Logan Hall, 33rd), 4th (Cade Otton, 106th), and 6th. Analysis: Lloyd became a useful starting linebacker but not a dominant force. The package sent — a 2nd and 4th — is a legitimate price to move into the back of Round 1. Tampa Bay received Logan Hall and Cade Otton, both of whom became starters. Both sides received fair value; neither dramatically outperformed. C+/C+ even trade is accurate.

Summary: Jacksonville traded CB C.J. Henderson — the 9th overall pick in 2020 — and a 5th to Carolina for TE Dan Arnold and a 3rd-round pick (Chad Muma, 70th). Analysis: Henderson had been a significant bust as a top-10 pick. Jacksonville turned him into a 3rd-round pick and Dan Arnold, who provided tight end depth. Muma became a starting linebacker. This is a well-executed exit from a failed first-round investment. B grade is appropriate — the Jaguars salvaged real value from a draft miss.

Seattle acquired Sidney Jones from Jacksonville Jaguars on 2021-08-31, sending 2022 6th round pick (188th overall subsequently traded, Malcolm Rodriguez) in return. This transaction fits Seattle's broader roster-building record for 2021: targeted asset movement, limited known aftershocks, and no obvious franchise-altering result. The Seahawks' B grade is tied to receiving Sidney Jones while parting with 2022 6th round pick (188th overall subsequently traded, Malcolm Rodriguez). Jacksonville Jaguars's side is graded C because the exchange appears roughly balanced from the available record.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2022 6th round pick (197th overall, Gregory Junior) from Philadelphia Eagles for Gardner Minshew. Analysis: Jacksonville received a late pick for a useful backup quarterback. Philadelphia got more practical value from the player than the pick cost suggested.

Summary: Pittsburgh acquired Joe Schobert from Jacksonville Jaguars for 2022 6th round pick (198th overall subsequently traded, Grant Calcaterra). Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange rather than a clear steal. Pittsburgh addressed its roster or draft-board preference, while Jacksonville Jaguars received comparable value in return.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Jameson Houston, 2023 6th round pick (208th overall, Erick Hallett) from Philadelphia Eagles for Josiah Scott. Analysis: This was a late-round or depth-chart exchange with limited franchise impact. The value difference is small enough to treat as essentially even.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2021 4th round pick (121st overall, Jordan Smith), 2021 6th round pick (209th overall, Jalen Camp) from Los Angeles/St. Louis Rams for 2021 4th round pick (130th overall, Robert Rochell), 2021 5th round pick (170th overall subsequently traded, Garret Wallow), 2021 7th round pick (249th overall, Ben Skowronek). Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2022 7th round pick (235th overall subsequently traded, Daniel Hardy) from Baltimore Ravens for Josh Oliver. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Malcom Brown from New Orleans Saints for 2021 7th round pick (229th overall subsequently traded, Mike Strachan). Analysis: This was a late-round or depth-chart exchange with limited franchise impact. The value difference is small enough to treat as essentially even.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Kamalei Correa, 2021 7th round pick (249th overall subsequently traded, Ben Skowronek) from Tennessee Titans for 2021 6th round pick (185th overall subsequently traded, Nick Niemann). Analysis: This was a late-round or depth-chart exchange with limited franchise impact. The value difference is small enough to treat as essentially even.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2021 5th round pick (170th overall subsequently traded, Garret Wallow) from Cleveland Browns for Ronnie Harrison. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Minnesota received Yannick Ngakoue and sent 2021 2nd round pick (45th overall, Walker Little) and 2022 5th round pick (157th overall subsequently traded, Zyon McCollum).

Summary: Jacksonville traded QB Nick Foles to Chicago for a 4th-round pick (Shaquille Quarterman, 140th). Analysis: Foles had been a expensive, disappointing starter in Jacksonville. Getting a 4th-round pick for a failed starter while clearing cap space was a solid outcome. Quarterman played meaningful defensive snaps for Jacksonville. B grade is appropriate — Jacksonville cleaned up a roster mistake while recovering usable draft capital.

Summary: Jacksonville traded DT Calais Campbell — a three-time Pro Bowler at the time — to Baltimore for a 5th-round pick (Daniel Thomas, 157th). Analysis: Campbell was 33 but had been the best defensive player on the Jaguars for years and was still highly productive. He immediately became a team captain and defensive anchor in Baltimore, earning Pro Bowl honors in 2020. A 5th-round pick for a player of this caliber is egregiously below market value, regardless of age or salary. F is not overstated — this is a salary dump masquerading as a trade, and the football value loss was enormous.

Denver acquired A.J. Bouye from Jacksonville Jaguars for 2020 4th round pick (137th overall, Josiah Scott). Denver paid draft capital for A.J. Bouye, making this a targeted personnel acquisition instead of a pure pick shuffle. The Broncos grade of C reflects the balance between immediate roster help and the opportunity cost of the pick sent to Jacksonville Jaguars.

Summary: Jacksonville traded CB Jalen Ramsey to the Rams for two 1st-round picks (20th overall, K'Lavon Chaisson; 25th overall, Travis Etienne) and a 4th. Analysis: Ramsey was the best cornerback in football at the time and had been holding out. Jacksonville maximized the return — two firsts and a fourth for a holdout player is strong compensation. Chaisson was a bust (D+ as a prospect), but Etienne became one of the premier running backs in the NFL. The Rams won the Super Bowl with Ramsey as a key piece, and he earned multiple All-Pro selections. The correct verdict acknowledges both sides: Jacksonville extracted maximum possible value from a forced situation and hit on one of two firsts. C- understates Jacksonville's return — this should be a B- or C+ at minimum. Grade revised to B-.

Summary: Pittsburgh acquired 2020 5th round pick (154th overall subsequently traded, Jason Strowbridge) from Jacksonville Jaguars for Joshua Dobbs. Analysis: The trade grades against Pittsburgh because the outgoing side carried more durable value, stronger draft upside, or a better long-term return for Jacksonville Jaguars.

Seattle acquired 2019 7th round pick (236th overall, John Ursua) from Jacksonville Jaguars on 2019-04-27, sending 2020 6th round pick (206th overall, Tyler Davis) in return. This transaction fits Seattle's broader roster-building record for 2019: targeted asset movement, limited known aftershocks, and no obvious franchise-altering result. The Seahawks' C grade is tied to receiving 2019 7th round pick (236th overall, John Ursua) while parting with 2020 6th round pick (206th overall, Tyler Davis). Jacksonville Jaguars's side is graded C because the exchange appears roughly balanced from the available record.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2019 2nd round pick (35th overall, Jawaan Taylor), 2019 5th round pick (140th overall, Ryquell Armstead), 2019 7th round pick (235th overall, Dontavius Russell) from Las Vegas/Oakland Raiders for 2019 2nd round pick (38th overall subsequently traded, Cody Ford), 2019 4th round pick (109th overall subsequently traded, Khari Willis). Analysis: Jacksonville moved up for Jawaan Taylor while also adding late capital. The deal produced a usable tackle and a slight value edge.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2019 3rd round pick (98th overall, Quincy Williams), 2020 5th round pick (165th overall, Collin Johnson) from Los Angeles/St. Louis Rams for Dante Fowler. Analysis: Jacksonville recovered a third-round pick and additional capital for a player who had not fully hit in Jacksonville. The Rams received useful pass-rush help, but the Jaguars return was reasonable.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Carlos Hyde from Cleveland Browns for 2019 5th round pick (144th overall subsequently traded, Marvell Tell). Analysis: Jacksonville spent a fifth-round pick for short-term running back depth that did not meaningfully change the offense. Cleveland captured the better asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville traded a 5th-round pick (Wyatt Teller, 166th) to Buffalo for DT Marcell Dareus during the 2017 playoff push. Analysis: Dareus was a multiple Pro Bowl interior defender who gave Jacksonville a legitimate run-stuffing presence. His contract was enormous and unsustainable long-term, but for a team with Super Bowl aspirations, the short-term football sense was sound. Teller became a Pro Bowl guard for Cleveland — a notable outcome from that 5th-round pick. C+ is too generous given that Jacksonville paid a pick that became a Pro Bowler for a short rental. Grade revised to C.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2019 7th round pick (236th overall subsequently traded, John Ursua) from Baltimore Ravens for Luke Bowanko. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Seattle acquired 2017 2nd round pick (35th overall, Malik McDowell); 2017 6th round pick (187th overall, Michael Tyson) from Jacksonville Jaguars on 2017-04-28, sending 2017 2nd round pick (34th overall, Cam Robinson) in return. The value case for Seattle comes down to the direct asset exchange: 2017 2nd round pick (35th overall, Malik McDowell); 2017 6th round pick (187th overall, Michael Tyson) for 2017 2nd round pick (34th overall, Cam Robinson). There is no clear evidence of a major downstream swing, so the grade stays modest rather than inflated. For TradeVerdicts, this row matters because it preserves the transaction trail without overstating the long-term Seahawks impact.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Branden Albert from Miami Dolphins for a conditional 2018 pick (not conveyed). Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange. Jacksonville addressed a roster or draft-board preference, while the partner received comparable value in return.

Summary: Jacksonville moved up 2 spots in Round 2 (38th to 36th) for Myles Jack, giving Baltimore an extra 5th-round pick (Matt Judon, 146th). Analysis: Jack became a multi-year starter and one of the better linebackers of the mid-2010s Jaguars defense. Moving up 2 spots in Round 2 for an extra 5th is a defensible, minor price. The notable wrinkle: the 5th-round pick became Matt Judon, who developed into a Pro Bowl pass rusher for Baltimore and New England. B+ for acquiring Jack still works structurally, but Jacksonville gave up more long-term value than the pick position suggested.

Summary: Pittsburgh acquired Josh Scobee from Jacksonville Jaguars for 2016 6th round pick (201st overall, Brandon Allen). Analysis: The trade grades against Pittsburgh because the outgoing side carried more durable value, stronger draft upside, or a better long-term return for Jacksonville Jaguars.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2015 4th round pick (104th overall, James Sample), 2015 7th round pick (229th overall, Ben Koyack) from New York Jets for 2015 4th round pick (103rd overall, Bryce Petty). Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville moved up 9 spots in Round 2 (70th to 61st) to select WR Allen Robinson, giving San Francisco a 5th-round pick (Aaron Lynch, 150th). Analysis: Robinson had an elite breakout season in 2015 (1,400 yards, 14 TDs, Pro Bowl) and was the best receiver in Jacksonville during his tenure. Moving up 9 spots in Round 2 for an extra 5th is a minimal cost for a player who became one of the better receivers in franchise history. A grade is fully justified. This is the best Jacksonville draft-day trade of the 2010s not named Trevor Lawrence.

Summary: Jacksonville moved up 12 spots in Round 3 (105th to 93rd) to select C Brandon Linder, giving New England a 6th-round pick (Jon Halapio). Analysis: Linder became a 7-year starter at center for Jacksonville and was one of the anchors of their offensive line. Moving up 12 spots in Round 3 for an extra 6th is a modest cost for a player who started over 80 games. A- grade is fair — Jacksonville got a reliable starter for minimal additional investment.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2014 6th round pick (205th overall, Luke Bowanko) from San Francisco 49ers for Blaine Gabbert. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville traded OT Eugene Monroe to Baltimore for a 4th-round pick (Aaron Colvin, 114th) and a 5th-round pick (Chris Smith, 159th). Analysis: Monroe was a quality starting left tackle and was only 26 at the time of the trade. Getting a 4th and 5th for a starting LT undervalues the position significantly — tackles of Monroe's caliber command 2nd-round picks or better. Colvin became a starter, and Smith had a long career; the picks hit, but Jacksonville sold too cheaply. This is a mild loss for Jacksonville, not a neutral. Grade revised to C-.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2013 4th round pick (101st overall, Ace Sanders), 2013 7th round pick (210th overall, Demetrius McCray) from Philadelphia Eagles for 2013 4th round pick (98th overall, Matt Barkley). Analysis: Jacksonville moved down slightly and added a seventh-rounder. The trade created modest extra value without a major opportunity cost.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2014 5th round pick (150th overall subsequently traded, Aaron Lynch) from Detroit Lions for Mike Thomas. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville traded up 2 spots (7th to 5th) to select WR Justin Blackmon, giving Tampa Bay a 4th-round pick (Omar Bolden, 101st). Analysis: Blackmon was a generational receiver prospect at Oklahoma State. The trade cost was reasonable — 2 spots plus a 4th. The problem was entirely off-field: Blackmon was suspended indefinitely by the NFL for substance violations after showing genuine on-field talent. He played 28 games, never reached his ceiling, and his career effectively ended at 24. D- is appropriate — Jacksonville lost a franchise receiver to circumstances they couldn't fully predict, but the outcome was devastatingly bad.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Dwight Lowery from New York Jets for 2012 7th round pick (214th overall subsequently traded, Tim Fugger). Analysis: Jacksonville paid a seventh-round pick for a useful defensive back. Lowery supplied more value than the acquisition cost suggested.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2011 3rd round pick (76th overall, Will Rackley) from San Francisco 49ers for 2011 3rd round pick (80th overall, Chris Culliver), 2011 6th round pick (182nd overall, Ronald Johnson). Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange. Jacksonville addressed a roster or draft-board preference, while the partner received comparable value in return.

Summary: Jacksonville moved up from #16 to #10 overall, sending Washington a 2nd-round pick (Ben Ijalana, 49th, later traded) to select Blaine Gabbert. Analysis: Gabbert is among the worst first-round quarterback selections in modern NFL history, and Jacksonville paid a premium to move up for him. Washington got Ryan Kerrigan at #16 — a productive sack machine who recorded 95.5 career sacks — plus an extra 2nd-round pick. Gabbert started 24 games for Jacksonville and went 5-19 before being replaced. The F grade is fully warranted. Jacksonville sacrificed future capital and got one of the least productive starting quarterbacks in franchise history.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired a conditional 2011 pick (not conveyed) from Green Bay Packers for Anthony Smith. Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange. Jacksonville addressed a roster or draft-board preference, while the partner received comparable value in return.

Summary: Jacksonville traded S Reggie Nelson — a former first-round pick — to Cincinnati for LB David Jones. Analysis: Nelson went on to a long and productive career in Cincinnati, making the Pro Bowl in 2015 and recording 28 interceptions over 12 seasons. David Jones contributed nothing meaningful to Jacksonville. Trading a first-round safety for a practice-squad caliber linebacker is a clear Jacksonville loss. D grade is correct.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Justin Smiley from Miami Dolphins for 2011 7th round pick (218th overall subsequently traded, Ryan Taylor). Analysis: This was a late-round or depth-chart exchange with limited franchise impact. The value difference is small enough to treat as essentially even.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Kirk Morrison, 2010 5th round pick (153rd overall, Austen Lane) from Las Vegas/Oakland Raiders for 2010 4th round pick (108th overall, Jacoby Ford). Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange. Jacksonville addressed a roster or draft-board preference, while the partner received comparable value in return.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2011 4th round pick (121st overall, Chris Prosinski) from New Orleans Saints for 2010 5th round pick (158th overall, Matt Tennant). Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville traded DE Quentin Groves — who never developed — to Las Vegas/Oakland Raiders for a 2010 5th-round pick (158th, Matt Tennant). Analysis: Groves was a failed 2nd-round investment from 2008. Getting any draft return — even a late 5th — for a bust is satisfactory asset recovery. The D grade is overstated for Jacksonville — this is a competent exit from a failed investment. Grade revised to C.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Luke McCown from Tampa Bay Buccaneers for 2010 7th round pick (217th overall, Dekoda Watson). Analysis: This was a late-round or depth-chart exchange with limited franchise impact. The value difference is small enough to treat as essentially even.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Gerald Alexander from Detroit Lions for Dennis Northcutt. Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange. Jacksonville addressed a roster or draft-board preference, while the partner received comparable value in return.

Summary: Jacksonville traded a 7th-round pick (Julian Edelman, 232nd) and a future 2010 2nd-round pick (44th overall, later traded as Lamarr Houston) to New England for a 3rd-round pick (Derek Cox, 73rd). Analysis: On the day of the trade, Jacksonville appeared to be moving up from a 7th and 2nd to a 3rd — reasonable-seeming. In hindsight, the 7th became Julian Edelman, one of the most productive receivers in Patriots history and a Super Bowl MVP. The 2nd-round pick (Houston) became a Pro Bowl linebacker. Derek Cox was a serviceable corner but nowhere near the combined value of what Jacksonville sent. This is one of the more quietly disastrous trades in Jaguars history. D grade is correct.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2009 7th round pick from Miami Dolphins for Tony McDaniel. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2008 5th round pick (155th overall, Thomas Williams), 2008 7th round pick (213th overall, Chauncey Washington) from Dallas Cowboys for 2008 5th round pick (143rd overall, Orlando Scandrick). Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville traded up from #26 to #8 overall, paying Baltimore a 3rd (Tavares Gooden), another 3rd (later became Steve Slaton), and a 4th (later became Arman Shields) to select Derrick Harvey. Analysis: Derrick Harvey is one of the most disastrous trades in Jacksonville history. Harvey produced 8.5 sacks in three seasons and was out of the league by 2012. Meanwhile, the picks Jacksonville surrendered helped Baltimore take Duane Brown (26th, traded to Houston) and draft Slaton, a 1,000-yard rusher. The price for Harvey (two 3rds and a 4th) was steep enough to justify an elite edge rusher — he was not elite. F is fully deserved. Jacksonville paid premium price for near-zero return.

Summary: Jacksonville moved up 6 spots in Round 2 (58th to 52nd) to select Quentin Groves, giving Tampa Bay an extra 5th and 7th. Analysis: Groves was selected as an edge rusher project and produced minimally in three Jacksonville seasons. The Buccaneers received Dexter Jackson (58th) — a useful defensive back — plus two extra picks. Jacksonville overpaid for a player who underdelivered. D grade is appropriate.

Summary: Jacksonville traded NT Marcus Stroud — a two-time Pro Bowler — to Buffalo for a 3rd-round pick (71st, later traded) and a 5th-round pick (143rd, later traded as Orlando Scandrick). Analysis: Stroud was coming off injuries but had been one of the best nose tackles in the NFL. Getting a 3rd and a 5th for him represents solid return for a declining, injury-prone veteran. The picks were later traded and became useful in other transactions. C- is too harsh for Jacksonville here — the asset return was reasonable for what Stroud was at that stage. Grade revised to C+.

Minnesota received 2008 6th round pick (193rd overall, Jaymar Johnson) and sent Troy Williamson.

Seattle acquired Alvin Pearman; an undisclosed 2007 draft pick from Jacksonville Jaguars on 2007-09-01, sending an undisclosed 2007 draft pick in return. This transaction fits Seattle's broader roster-building record for 2007: targeted asset movement, limited known aftershocks, and no obvious franchise-altering result. The Seahawks' C grade is tied to receiving Alvin Pearman; an undisclosed 2007 draft pick while parting with an undisclosed 2007 draft pick. Jacksonville Jaguars's side is graded C because the exchange appears roughly balanced from the available record.

Summary: Jacksonville consolidated three 6th-round picks (195th, 198th, 203rd) into one 5th-round pick (149th overall, Uche Nwaneri). Analysis: Nwaneri became a multi-year starting right guard for Jacksonville, a starter-quality return from what was essentially a bundle of late picks. The pick consolidation worked perfectly, netting a position-starter from three roster longshots. A- is fair — this is exactly the kind of roster management move that builds sustainable depth. Atlanta received depth volume (Deon Anderson was later traded to Dallas, Doug Datish and Daren Stone had minimal impact) but gave up the clearly superior player.

Denver acquired 2007 1st round pick (17th overall, Jarvis Moss) from Jacksonville Jaguars in exchange for 2007 1st round pick (21st overall, Reggie Nelson), 2007 3rd round pick (86th overall subsequently traded, Marshal Yanda) and 2007 6th round pick (198th overall subsequently traded, Doug Datish). This was primarily a draft-position exchange, with Denver reshaping its pick stack rather than adding an established player. The grades stay conservative because the historical value depends on how the selected players developed after the swap.

Summary: Jacksonville traded the 86th pick (Marshal Yanda) to Baltimore and received three picks: Adam Podlesh (101st, punter), Derek Landri (166th), and a 6th-round pick. Analysis: On the surface, moving down for extra picks looks fine. In reality, this is one of Jacksonville's costliest undervaluation mistakes. Marshal Yanda became arguably the best offensive guard of his generation — a 9-time Pro Bowler who played at an All-Pro level for 13 seasons. Jacksonville got a punter and two fringe players. This was not a C+ trade; it was a quiet catastrophe in hindsight. Grade revised to D+. Because Yanda became a Hall-of-Fame-caliber guard, this belongs among the franchise's major missed-value trades.

Summary: Jacksonville traded a 6th-round pick to San Francisco for two 7th-round picks, taking James Wyche and Dee Webb. Analysis: This was a small draft-board reshuffle with limited long-term impact. Jacksonville gained two swings instead of one, but neither side extracted enough value to claim a clear win.

Summary: Jacksonville moved from pick 92 to pick 80 in the 2006 draft, sending Dallas pick 92 and pick 125 to select linebacker Clint Ingram. Analysis: Ingram became a useful starter-caliber defender for Jacksonville, but Dallas landed Jason Hatcher at 92, and Hatcher became the best long-term player in the exchange. The move was defensible but not a major Jaguars win.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired veteran linebacker Jamie Winborn from San Francisco for an undisclosed 2005 draft pick. Analysis: This was a modest in-season depth move rather than a franchise-altering trade. Winborn gave the Jaguars a usable linebacker option, but the limited record and unspecified pick value keep the grade in neutral territory.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired an undisclosed 2005 draft pick from Dallas Cowboys for Seth Marler. Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange. Jacksonville addressed a roster or draft-board preference, while the partner received comparable value in return.

Summary: Jacksonville traded the 123rd pick (Kerry Rhodes) to the Jets and received the 127th (Alvin Pearman) and a 6th (Chad Owens, 185th). Analysis: Moving down 4 spots and adding an extra pick is sound draft housekeeping. Notably, Kerry Rhodes became a productive Pro Bowl safety for the Jets — Jacksonville gave up real value here. The pick math slightly favors Jacksonville but the player outcome reverses that narrative. C+ on structure; the player outcome mildly undercuts the grade.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2004 4th round pick (120th overall, Ernest Wilford) from Baltimore Ravens for Kevin Johnson. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2004 5th round pick (159th overall, Sean Bubin) from Houston Texans for 2004 6th round pick (175th overall, Jammal Lord), 2004 7th round pick (210th overall, Raheem Orr). Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2004 3rd round pick (87th overall subsequently traded, B.J. Sander) from Green Bay Packers for 2004 3rd round pick (70th overall, Joey Thomas), 2004 4th round pick (102nd overall subsequently traded, Will Poole). Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange. Jacksonville addressed a roster or draft-board preference, while the partner received comparable value in return.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2004 5th round pick (150th overall, Chris Thompson) from New Orleans Saints for Jason Craft. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville traded franchise QB Mark Brunell — well past his prime — to Washington for a 2004 3rd-round pick (72nd overall, later traded as Donnell Washington). Analysis: By 2004, Brunell's best years were behind him; Jacksonville had already shifted toward Byron Leftwich. Getting a 3rd-round pick for a veteran starting QB, even a declining one, represents solid return. Washington got a recognizable name but a diminished player. B is appropriate — Jacksonville made a savvy exit from an aging contract while recovering draft capital.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Anthony Mitchell from Baltimore Ravens for 2004 7th round pick (210th overall subsequently traded, Raheem Orr). Analysis: This was a late-round or depth-chart exchange with limited franchise impact. The value difference is small enough to treat as essentially even.

Summary: Jacksonville traded the 143rd pick (Justin Gage) to Chicago and received three late picks: 176th (Brandon Green), 193rd (Marques Ogden), 218th (Malaefou MacKenzie). Analysis: Jacksonville gave up one 5th-round pick and received three picks in rounds 6-7. On pure pick-value charts, three late picks rarely exceed one mid-5th, but the volume gives the Jaguars three roster lottery tickets. None of the returning picks hit. Gage had a modest NFL career as a receiver. C+ is accurate — the pick consolidation math works, but the player outcomes are a wash.

Seattle acquired an undisclosed 2003 draft pick from Jacksonville Jaguars on 2002-06-20, sending Ike Charlton in return. The value case for Seattle comes down to the direct asset exchange: an undisclosed 2003 draft pick for Ike Charlton. There is no clear evidence of a major downstream swing, so the grade stays modest rather than inflated. For TradeVerdicts, this row matters because it preserves the transaction trail without overstating the long-term Seahawks impact.

Summary: Jacksonville traded the 76th pick (Melvin Fowler) to Cleveland and received Wali Rainer and the 79th pick (Rashad Bauman, later traded). Analysis: Moving down three spots and adding a veteran linebacker (Rainer) looks attractive on paper, but Rainer provided minimal impact in Jacksonville. The picks were close enough in value that the player add was the differentiator — and that player underperformed. This rates as a true even trade.

Summary: Jacksonville traded down 10 spots in the 3rd round (79th to 89th) and added a 4th-round pick, landing Akin Ayodele (89th) and Chris Luzar (118th). Analysis: Moving down 10 spots in the 3rd round and picking up a 4th is a reasonable value capture. Ayodele became a useful starting linebacker; Luzar did not stick. Jacksonville extracted a pick while still getting a playable player. This is a minor Jacksonville lean, not a true even trade.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired OG Brenden Stai from Kansas City for a 2001 4th-round pick (George Layne, 108th). Analysis: Stai was a proven veteran lineman coming off solid seasons in Pittsburgh and Kansas City. Spending a mid-round pick for an established offensive guard is reasonable roster-building, though Stai provided only one year of utility in Jacksonville. The trade is fairly valued at C — neither team gained a meaningful edge.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired DE Regan Upshaw from Tampa Bay for a 2001 6th-round pick. Analysis: Upshaw was a situational pass rusher with starting experience coming off solid Tampa Bay years. Getting a proven edge player in his prime for a late 6th-round pick is a slight Jaguars win, not an even trade. Upshaw contributed meaningfully in Jacksonville's defensive rotation during their late-1990s contention window.

Seattle acquired Cordell Taylor from Jacksonville Jaguars on 1999-09-05, sending an undisclosed 2001 draft pick in return. The value case for Seattle comes down to the direct asset exchange: Cordell Taylor for an undisclosed 2001 draft pick. There is no clear evidence of a major downstream swing, so the grade stays modest rather than inflated. For TradeVerdicts, this row matters because it preserves the transaction trail without overstating the long-term Seahawks impact.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 1999 6th round pick (182nd overall, Emarlos Leroy) from Tampa Bay Buccaneers for 1999 6th round pick (195th overall, Lamarr Glenn), 1999 7th round pick (233rd overall, Autry Denson). Analysis: This was a late-round or depth-chart exchange with limited franchise impact. The value difference is small enough to treat as essentially even.

Summary: Jacksonville traded QB Rob Johnson to Buffalo for the 9th overall pick in 1998 (Fred Taylor) and a 4th-round pick (Tavian Banks). Analysis: This is the second most important trade in Jaguars history. Jacksonville cashed in Johnson — who never developed into a starter in Buffalo — at peak perceived value and received the pick that became Fred Taylor. Taylor rushed for 11,271 yards, made the Pro Bowl in 2003, and remains the franchise's all-time leading rusher. The trade worked perfectly: Buffalo absorbed Johnson's limitations at enormous cost while Jacksonville got a franchise-defining running back for a backup quarterback. The A+ grade and F for Buffalo are both fully justified.

Summary: Jacksonville traded veteran DT Paul Frase to Green Bay for a 6th-round pick (Kevin McLeod, 182nd). Analysis: Frase was a depth lineman at the tail end of his career. Extracting any pick value for an aging reserve is roster management, not a win. McLeod had a brief career as a fullback. Grade of C is accurate — this is a minor depth swap with negligible franchise consequence.

Summary: Jacksonville traded OL Jimmy Herndon to Chicago for a 7th-round pick (Alvis Whitted, 192nd). Analysis: Herndon was a reserve lineman with no lasting impact. Getting any draft capital back — even a late 7th — for a depth player represents decent roster housekeeping. Whitted had a brief NFL career as a receiver. A routine swap between two low-value assets.

Seattle acquired 1996 4th round pick (99th overall, Phillip Daniels) from Jacksonville Jaguars on 1996-04-20, sending 1996 4th round pick (110th overall, Reggie Barlow); 1996 5th round pick (146th overall, Jimmy Herndon) in return. From a hindsight view, the Seahawks neither created a defining win nor suffered a major loss here. The important public-facing detail is the actual exchange — 1996 4th round pick (99th overall, Phillip Daniels) for 1996 4th round pick (110th overall, Reggie Barlow); 1996 5th round pick (146th overall, Jimmy Herndon) — rather than a forced storyline. That makes the row useful for database completeness while keeping it below the major-trade tier.

Summary: Jacksonville traded four picks (3rd, 4th, 5th, 5th) to Miami and received a 2nd-round pick (Michael Cheever, 60th) and a 4th. Analysis: Jacksonville moved up from the 3rd round into the 2nd, consolidating four selections into two. Cheever provided minimal impact as a lineman, and the picks on Miami's side (Brew, Edwards, McPhail, Burton) yielded mixed results. The math slightly favored Jacksonville in positional round value, but the player returns on both sides were modest. Grade it as a minor JAX lean given the round upgrade; C+ is more accurate than C.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired TE Pete Mitchell from Miami for WR Mike Williams in a preseason roster swap. Analysis: Mitchell became a solid contributor as a blocking tight end and pass-catching option in the early Brunell-era offense. Williams was a depth receiver with minimal impact. Jacksonville got the more useful player in this swap, earning a slight historical lean.

Summary: Jacksonville moved up 13 spots from the 5th to the 4th round, giving up a 6th-rounder in a future year to do so. Analysis: A minor round-consolidation move in Jacksonville's first expansion draft. Mike Thompson (123rd) provided minimal impact, but the cost was equally low. This is a standard draft-board housekeeping swap with no meaningful franchise consequence.

Summary: Jacksonville swapped three late picks (6th, 7th, 7th) to Philadelphia for a 5th-round pick (Ryan Christopherson, 169th) and a 7th (Curtis Marsh, 219th). Analysis: Jacksonville consolidated three deep picks into an earlier selection. Christopherson and Marsh provided minimal NFL impact, as did the Eagles' side. A textbook late-round pick consolidation with no lasting consequence.

Summary: Jacksonville moved up 12 spots in the 1995 draft, paying three extra picks to select James Stewart 19th overall. Analysis: As an expansion team in its first draft, moving up for an immediate-impact back made roster sense. Stewart was productive early, logging 1,000+ rushing yards in 1997, but the accumulated draft cost (3rd, 4th, 4th) was steep for a player who never became a franchise cornerstone. The Jaguars got real value but overpaid relative to outcome.

Summary: Jacksonville moved down seven spots in the second round, adding a third-round pick while landing Brian DeMarco (40th) and Chris Hudson (71st). Analysis: An expansion team trading surplus value for extra picks was sound draft management. DeMarco provided depth along the offensive line, and Hudson became a solid defensive back contributor. This is a clean, value-positive move for a first-year franchise learning to build through the draft.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Mark Brunell from Green Bay for a 3rd-round pick (William Henderson, 66th) and a 5th-round pick (Travis Jervey, 170th). Analysis: This is the single most consequential trade in Jaguars history. Brunell became the franchise quarterback, leading Jacksonville to back-to-back AFC Championship appearances (1996, 1999) and setting nearly every passing record in franchise history at the time. The Packers already had Brett Favre and had no use for Brunell; Jacksonville paid mid-round picks for a franchise-altering quarterback. The value disparity is enormous. Henderson became a solid fullback — the Packers won their side of the player exchange — but Jacksonville's organizational return is incomparable. A+ is the correct grade. Arguably the best trade in franchise history. It remains the gold-standard trade win in Jaguars history.