Baltimore Ravens

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2022 7th round pick (235th overall subsequently traded, Daniel Hardy) from Baltimore Ravens for Josh Oliver. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Minnesota received 2021 3rd round pick (90th overall, Patrick Jones) and 2022 5th round pick (156th overall subsequently traded, Jerome Ford) and sent Yannick Ngakoue.

Minnesota received 2020 7th round pick (225th overall, Kenny Willekes) and 2021 5th round pick (168th overall, Zach Davidson) and sent 2020 6th round pick (201st overall, James Proche) and 2020 7th round pick (219th overall, Geno Stone).

Summary: Pittsburgh acquired Chris Wormley and 2021 7th round pick (254th overall, Pressley Harvin) from Baltimore Ravens for 2021 5th round pick (168th overall subsequently traded, Zach Davidson). Analysis: This 2020 transaction with Baltimore Ravens registered as a roughly balanced exchange. Both clubs addressed their stated roster or draft-board priorities without a clear winner emerging from the historical record. The assets involved were comparable in tier and subsequent career value.

Summary: Jacksonville traded DT Calais Campbell — a three-time Pro Bowler at the time — to Baltimore for a 5th-round pick (Daniel Thomas, 157th). Analysis: Campbell was 33 but had been the best defensive player on the Jaguars for years and was still highly productive. He immediately became a team captain and defensive anchor in Baltimore, earning Pro Bowl honors in 2020. A 5th-round pick for a player of this caliber is egregiously below market value, regardless of age or salary. F is not overstated — this is a salary dump masquerading as a trade, and the football value loss was enormous.

Minnesota received Kaare Vedvik and sent 2020 5th round pick (170th overall, Broderick Washington).

Minnesota received 2019 3rd round pick (102nd overall, Alexander Mattison), 2019 6th round pick (191st overall, Marcus Epps) and 2019 6th round pick (193rd overall, Oli Udoh) and sent 2019 3rd round pick (93rd overall, Miles Boykin).

Denver acquired Joe Flacco from Baltimore Ravens for 2019 4th round pick (113th overall, Justice Hill). Denver paid draft capital for Joe Flacco, making this a targeted personnel acquisition instead of a pure pick shuffle. The Broncos grade of C reflects the balance between immediate roster help and the opportunity cost of the pick sent to Baltimore Ravens.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2019 7th round pick (236th overall subsequently traded, John Ursua) from Baltimore Ravens for Luke Bowanko. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Summary: Jacksonville moved up 2 spots in Round 2 (38th to 36th) for Myles Jack, giving Baltimore an extra 5th-round pick (Matt Judon, 146th). Analysis: Jack became a multi-year starter and one of the better linebackers of the mid-2010s Jaguars defense. Moving up 2 spots in Round 2 for an extra 5th is a defensible, minor price. The notable wrinkle: the 5th-round pick became Matt Judon, who developed into a Pro Bowl pass rusher for Baltimore and New England. B+ for acquiring Jack still works structurally, but Jacksonville gave up more long-term value than the pick position suggested.

Denver acquired Gino Gradkowski and 2016 5th round pick (144th overall, Connor McGovern) from Baltimore Ravens for 2016 4th round pick (130th overall, Alex Lewis). This was primarily a draft-position exchange, with Denver reshaping its pick stack rather than adding an established player. The grades stay conservative because the historical value depends on how the selected players developed after the swap.

Summary: Jacksonville traded OT Eugene Monroe to Baltimore for a 4th-round pick (Aaron Colvin, 114th) and a 5th-round pick (Chris Smith, 159th). Analysis: Monroe was a quality starting left tackle and was only 26 at the time of the trade. Getting a 4th and 5th for a starting LT undervalues the position significantly — tackles of Monroe's caliber command 2nd-round picks or better. Colvin became a starter, and Smith had a long career; the picks hit, but Jacksonville sold too cheaply. This is a mild loss for Jacksonville, not a neutral. Grade revised to C-.

Seattle acquired 2013 2nd round pick (62nd overall, Christine Michael), 2013 5th round pick (165th overall subsequently traded, Sam Martin); 2013 6th round pick (199th overall subsequently traded, Theo Riddick) from Baltimore Ravens on 2013-04-26, sending 2013 2nd round pick (56th overall, Arthur Brown) in return. Seattle's side of this 2013 draft-capital exchange was straightforward: the Seahawks received 2013 2nd round pick (62nd overall, Christine Michael), 2013 5th round pick (165th overall subsequently traded, Sam Martin); 2013 6th round pick (199th overall subsequently traded, Theo Riddick) and surrendered 2013 2nd round pick (56th overall, Arthur Brown). The C grade reflects the known return, while Baltimore Ravens's C grade accounts for the countervalue. The trade belongs as a minor database entry because its documented impact was real but not franchise-shaping.

Minnesota aggressively moved back into Round 1 for Harrison Smith, who became a franchise-great safety.

Seattle acquired 2011 5th round pick (157th overall subsequently traded, Doug Hogue) from Baltimore Ravens on 2010-08-31, sending Josh Wilson in return. The value case for Seattle comes down to the direct asset exchange: 2011 5th round pick (157th overall subsequently traded, Doug Hogue) for Josh Wilson. There is no clear evidence of a major downstream swing, so the grade stays modest rather than inflated. For TradeVerdicts, this row matters because it preserves the transaction trail without overstating the long-term Seahawks impact.

Denver traded up into the first round at pick 25 overall to select Tim Tebow, sending second-, third-, and fourth-round picks to Baltimore. The trade-up price was real: Baltimore used those picks to draft Sergio Kindle, Ed Dickson, and Dennis Pitta — a haul that included two long-term contributors. Tebow became a cultural phenomenon and delivered an unforgettable playoff run, but the cost in draft capital for a non-traditional quarterback proved steep.

Denver acquired 2009 5th round pick (141st overall, Kenny McKinley) from Baltimore Ravens for 2009 5th round pick (149th overall, Davon Drew) and 2009 6th round pick (185th overall, Cedric Peerman). This was primarily a draft-position exchange, with Denver reshaping its pick stack rather than adding an established player. The grades stay conservative because the historical value depends on how the selected players developed after the swap.

Seattle acquired 2008 2nd round pick (38th overall, John Carlson) from Baltimore Ravens on 2008-04-26, sending 2008 2nd round pick (55th overall, Ray Rice); 2008 3rd round pick (86th overall, Tom Zbikowski) in return. The value case for Seattle comes down to the direct asset exchange: 2008 2nd round pick (38th overall, John Carlson) for 2008 2nd round pick (55th overall, Ray Rice); 2008 3rd round pick (86th overall, Tom Zbikowski). There is no clear evidence of a major downstream swing, so the grade stays modest rather than inflated. For TradeVerdicts, this row matters because it preserves the transaction trail without overstating the long-term Seahawks impact.

Summary: Jacksonville traded up from #26 to #8 overall, paying Baltimore a 3rd (Tavares Gooden), another 3rd (later became Steve Slaton), and a 4th (later became Arman Shields) to select Derrick Harvey. Analysis: Derrick Harvey is one of the most disastrous trades in Jacksonville history. Harvey produced 8.5 sacks in three seasons and was out of the league by 2012. Meanwhile, the picks Jacksonville surrendered helped Baltimore take Duane Brown (26th, traded to Houston) and draft Slaton, a 1,000-yard rusher. The price for Harvey (two 3rds and a 4th) was steep enough to justify an elite edge rusher — he was not elite. F is fully deserved. Jacksonville paid premium price for near-zero return.

Summary: Jacksonville traded the 86th pick (Marshal Yanda) to Baltimore and received three picks: Adam Podlesh (101st, punter), Derek Landri (166th), and a 6th-round pick. Analysis: On the surface, moving down for extra picks looks fine. In reality, this is one of Jacksonville's costliest undervaluation mistakes. Marshal Yanda became arguably the best offensive guard of his generation — a 9-time Pro Bowler who played at an All-Pro level for 13 seasons. Jacksonville got a punter and two fringe players. This was not a C+ trade; it was a quiet catastrophe in hindsight. Grade revised to D+. Because Yanda became a Hall-of-Fame-caliber guard, this belongs among the franchise's major missed-value trades.

Summary: Jacksonville acquired 2004 4th round pick (120th overall, Ernest Wilford) from Baltimore Ravens for Kevin Johnson. Analysis: Jacksonville converted a roster piece into draft capital. The return was modest, but the move created usable asset value.

Minnesota received 2004 3rd round pick (88th overall, Darrion Scott) and 2004 5th round pick (155th overall, Rod Davis) and sent 2004 3rd round pick (82nd overall, Devard Darling).

Summary: Jacksonville acquired Anthony Mitchell from Baltimore Ravens for 2004 7th round pick (210th overall subsequently traded, Raheem Orr). Analysis: This was a late-round or depth-chart exchange with limited franchise impact. The value difference is small enough to treat as essentially even.

Denver acquired 2002 3rd round pick (96th overall, Dorsett Davis) from Baltimore Ravens in exchange for 2002 4th round pick (112th overall, Dave Zastudil) and 2002 5th round pick (155th overall, Terry Jones). This was primarily a draft-position exchange, with Denver reshaping its pick stack rather than adding an established player. The grades stay conservative because the historical value depends on how the selected players developed after the swap.

Denver acquired 2000 1st round pick (15th overall, Deltha O'Neal) and 2000 2nd round pick (45th overall, Kenoy Kennedy) from Baltimore Ravens in exchange for 2000 1st round pick (10th overall, Travis Taylor). This was primarily a draft-position exchange, with Denver reshaping its pick stack rather than adding an established player. The grades stay conservative because the historical value depends on how the selected players developed after the swap.

Minnesota received 1999 6th round pick (185th overall, Talance Sawyer) and sent Everett Lindsay.

Summary: Pittsburgh acquired 1998 7th round pick (199th overall subsequently traded, Ephraim Salaam) from Baltimore Ravens for Bernard Dafney. Analysis: The available record points to a balanced exchange rather than a clear steal. Pittsburgh addressed its roster or draft-board preference, while Baltimore Ravens received comparable value in return. The grade is deliberately conservative because part of the source record is incomplete, conditional, approximate, or still too recent for a firm historical verdict.

Denver acquired Tony Jones from Baltimore Ravens in exchange for 1997 2nd round pick (58th overall, Kim Herring). Denver paid draft capital for Tony Jones, making this a targeted personnel acquisition instead of a pure pick shuffle. The Broncos grade of C reflects the balance between immediate roster help and the opportunity cost of the pick sent to Baltimore Ravens.

Denver acquired 1996 3rd round pick (65th overall, Detron Smith), 1996 4th round pick (100th overall, Jeff Lewis) and 1996 7th round pick (213th overall, Leslie Ratliffe) from Baltimore Ravens in exchange for 1996 2nd round pick (55th overall, DeRon Jenkins). This was primarily a draft-position exchange, with Denver reshaping its pick stack rather than adding an established player. The grades stay conservative because the historical value depends on how the selected players developed after the swap.

Seattle acquired 1997 4th round pick (100th overall subsequently traded, Henri Crockett) from Baltimore Ravens on 1996-03-12, sending Jeff Blackshear in return. Seattle's side of this 1996 draft-capital exchange was straightforward: the Seahawks received 1997 4th round pick (100th overall subsequently traded, Henri Crockett) and surrendered Jeff Blackshear. The C+ grade reflects the known return, while Baltimore Ravens's C grade accounts for the countervalue. The trade belongs as a standard database entry because its documented impact was real but not franchise-shaping.